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ABSTRACT 
Recent years have witnessed anecdotal evidence for 
the contribution of good supplier relationship to the 
competitive performance of firms. This dissertation is 
a study of the association between inter-firm behaviour 
and relational performance for competitiveness in a 
supplier management perspective, within a conceptual 
framework that includes the inter-firm structure as a 
moderator. Electronics manufacturing firms in Hong Kong 
were chosen as a sample for the study, as they exhibited 
high demand for strategic buyer-seller relationship in 
coping with highly turbulent environments. 
The governance structure of inter-firm relationship 
is multidimensional. The traditional transaction cost 
approach to examine governance has been enriched by the 
power-dependence and social exchange theories (Hallen, 
Johanson and Seyed-Mohamed 1991)• Buyer-seller 
relationship is one of contractual in nature and has 
been subjected to transaction cost and power-dependence 
analyses. However, there are limitations of contract to 
presentiate exchange into the future. As time elapses, 
structural inducement would also lead to mutual 
adaptations. Social norms (Macneil 1980) thus evolve as 
a governance mode that mirror the goals of the exchange 
parties. 
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The conceptual framework of the study proposes an 
association between transactional norms and perceived 
relational performance. The relationship is moderated by 
inter-firm structural dimensions of formalisation, 
centralisation and connectedness. Norms encompassing 
the underlying structure of relational governance that 
substitute law/authority governance have been 
conceptuali sed to include solidarity, mutuality, 
flexibility, role integrity and harmonisation of 
conflict. Relational performance is perceived by the 
buyer as the supplier's contribution to its competitive 
performance； operational!sed through the rational goal, 
internal process, human relations and open system models 
of Quinn and Rohrbaugh (1983) . The competitive 
performance relates to the objectives of cost 
rationalisation, quality conformance, innovation and 
speed/responsiveness. 
Hypotheses were established based on literature and 
company cases and a survey was conducted among buyers in 
electronics firms in Hong Kong. Analyses of 142 useful 
returned questionnaires followed the process of firstly 
purifying the measures through reliability and validity 
tests. Regressions were then run on the factor scores 
of factors identified and Chow's (1960) test was used to 
examine the moderating effect of inter-firm structure on 
the norms and relational performance relationship. The 
analyses supported most of the hypotheses of the study. 
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In summary, both formal isati on and centralisation 
were found to moderate the effects of norms on perceived 
relational performance in cost, quality and innovation; 
while connectedness had not been clearly defined for its 
moderating effect. Despite this, implications to 
supplier management are obvious: relationship does not 
automatically enhance perceived performance. Instead, 
structure as a framework of management of inter-firm 
tasks will moderate the process. 
Limitations of the study mainly lie on its use of 
single informant and one-sided study of the perceived 
buyer-seller relationship. Future research should 
address these issues and attempt to extend the scope to 
the study of relationship networks. 
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Within the last decade, both competitive strategies 
and inter-organisational linkages have emerged as 
significant issues for firms operating in an 
increasingly turbulent environment. The proliferation 
of alliance relationships among firms competing in the 
same industry, members in marketing channels, firms in 
international joint ventures, as well as buyers and 
sellers in industrial markets has all suggested that 
cooperation can be a strategic tool for achieving 
competitiveness. The alliance or exchange relationships, 
however, depict a complex form of interactions among the 
organisations concerned. This dissertation is a study of 
the association between relational performance for 
competitiveness and inter-organisational behaviour 
between buyers and sellers in industrial markets. 
Supplier relationship in the electronics industry in 
Hong Kong is chosen as a context and sample of the 
study, as it exhibits high demand for strategic buyer-
seller relationship in coping with highly competitive 
international environments. This introduction chapter 
sets the scene on how inter-organisational 
relationships, and supplier relationship in particular, 
may emerge and affect the competitive performance of 
firms. 
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Analysis of Competitiveness at Different Levels 
Business enterprises compete with each others for 
superior performance and hence profit premium to sustain 
their growth. An examination of the extant literature on 
competition and competitiveness reveals that a wide 
variety of notions are involved and analyses can be made 
at different levels - at country level, industry and 
firm level and product-market level. Also, in strategic 
management and international business literature, a 
substantial amount of work has been developed in 
identifying generic competitive strategies, based on 
strategy components and resource deployment in the 
value-creation process in global markets. The primary 
emphasis has been on examining the link between 
environment, strategy and competitive performance in the 
context of an open-system for business (Hofer and 
Schendel 1978, Miller 1986, Porter 1980). There is also 
an array of measures which purports to the surrogates of 
competitiveness. Buckley, Pass and Prescott (1988), for 
example, contend that single measures of competitiveness 
do not capture all the elements of the concept. 
Competitiveness is within the context of dynamic 
interplay among process, potential and performance of 
management. Studies on competitive business performance 
have thus emerged with the identification of a number of 
typologies or taxonomies of business strategies based on 
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priori conceptual frameworks and empirical 
investigation. 
At the country level, Porter (1990) postulates that 
a nation's competitiveness depend on the capacity of its 
industry to innovate and upgrade. The analysis of the 
characteristics of national environment is based on the 
interactions of (1) factor conditions, (2) demand 
conditions, (3) related and supporting industries, and 
(4) firm strategy, structure and rivalry, which 
constitute the "national diamond". These four sets of 
variables, together with factors of chance and 
government, in fact influence the capabilities of firms 
to establish and sustain competitive advantage in the 
international marketplace. For a firm, country-specific 
factors are important in formulating corporate and 
business strategies. Studies have been undertaken to 
examine the association between country factors and 
business strategies of firms (see for example, Huo and 
McKinley 1992). Shan and Hamilton (1991) also tested the 
hypothesis that country-specific advantage embedded in 
firms of a particular nationality is motivation for 
international inter-firm cooperation. 
At the industry and firm level, Porter (1980) 
introduces five basic forces 一 from suppliers, buyers, 
new entrants, substitutes and industry competitors, the 
collective strength of which determines the ultimate 
profit potential of an industry. Miles and Snow (1978) 
identify four strategic types of firms - defenders, 
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prospectors, analysers and reactors； based on field 
studies in four industries, and with the degree of 
product innovation and market development being the key 
underlying dimension. Subsequent research of Snow and 
Hrebiniak (1980) and Miller (1987) have investigated the 
attributes or policies that characterise the different 
strategic types, as well as their effectiveness under 
different environmental conditions such as different 
stages of the product life cycle. Another representative 
stream of research at this level is well recorded 
initially by Porter (1985), in which three generic 
strategies of cost leadership, differentiation and focus 
are identified. The generic strategies are ways of 
developing sustainable competitive advantage over 
competitors in industry. A number of empirical studies 
(e.g. Dess and Davis 1984, Galbraith and Schendel 1983) 
has been conducted to test the validity of Porter»s 
generic strategies• When applied in an international 
context. Porter (1986) posits that competitiveness 
through lower cost and/or differentiation for a certain 
scope of target market is achieved through (1) 
configuration 一 refers to where the various links of the 
value chain are located, and (2) coordination - refers 
to how linked activities performed in different 
countries are coordinated with each others. 
At the product-market level, Mathur (1988) argues 
that the offering - what customers choose to buy -
should be the focus of competitive strategy. A 
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classification of competitive strategies can be 
determined by positioning the products in terms of 
differentiated/undifferentiated merchandise and 
differentiated/undifferentiated support. Other analyses 
on competitiveness at product-market level can be found 
in typical marketing strategy texts, within the context 
of market-driven strategy of firms (Day 1986, Day and 
Wensley 1988) . When competitive strategy of a firm is 
described as "a plan about the future positioning of the 
businesses offering, relative to those of competitors, 
in the eyes of customers" (Ohmae 1982) , the linkage 
between product offerings and the firms concerned is 
made clear. A firm is competitive if it can produce 
products and services of superior quality and lower 
costs than its domestic and international competitors. 
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Firm-in-environment 
When the competitiveness of a firm is focused for a 
study, it is crucial to examine its competitive strategy 
in the context of firm-in-environment, when sustention 
of competitive performance in changing environments is 
instrumental to the long-run profitability of the firm. 
The classical underlying theory of firm-in-
environment is the population ecology theory which 
emphasises the powerful constraining influence of 
environments on organisational autonomy (Hannan and 
Freeman 1977, Aldrich 1979) . This "survival of the 
fittest" concept of environment challenges the validity 
of the notion of strategic choice (Child 1972), the 
argument of which is that the formulation and 
implementation of strategies are essentially a proactive 
process. 
The population ecology theory has been modified by 
two significant advances. First, the resource-dependence 
perspectives of Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) focused on 
the input-output exchange relationships that determine 
the autonomy and control of an organisation vis-a-vis 
its environment. The implication is that the 
organisation can actively shape its sources of 
interdependence with the environment through inter-firm 
exchanges. Second, the concept of stakeholder management 
(Ansoff 1965) identified specific interest groups (e.g. 
suppliers, competitors) that are crucial to the 
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functioning of an organisation. Through appropriate 
strategic interactions with these groups, management can 
construct a "negotiated environment" (Cyert and March 
1963) and safeguard against environmental threats. 
These modifications to the population ecology 
theory have meant that business environments are 
susceptible to influence by the organisation, through 
its coalitions with other entities. Inter-firm linkages 
thus dampen the effects of environmental uncertainty. 
The concept coincides with the open-system view of an 
organisation, which sees the organisation as exchanging 
information and other inputs and outputs with its 
environment (Kast and Rosenzweig 1972, Scott 1987)• 
To address issues on how a firm competes in 
resource-dependence and open-system perspectives of 
environment and organisation, it is important to 
identify firstly the complexity and dynamism of business 
environment. Recent years witnessed rapid changes in 
global competition and industrial structure. Continuing 
proliferation of technology and managerial know-how has 
slowly dismantled the economic and political boundaries. 
Correspondingly, firms in the global economy will have 
to cope with fragmented worldwide markets. Huber (1984) 
has synthesised the features of future environments into 
three dominant characteristics: (1) more and increasing 
diversity, (2) more and increasing knowledge, and (3) 
more and increasing turbulence. Firms in environmental 
diversity have to deal with varieties of product-market 
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mix and become a globally diverse companies, described 
by Miles and Snow (1984) as "world enterprise, buying 
raw materials wherever they are cheapest, manufacturing 
wherever costs are lowest, and selling wherever the 
products will bring the highest price". In knowledge-
rich environments, firms are increasing their task 
specialisation, and forming their core expertise. 
Coupled with the required information processing 
capacity, firms tend to be of leaner structure and 
possess a flatter hierarchy, in order to speedily 
respond to market needs. Turbulence of environment is 
characterised by the increasing pace of technological 
changes, interconnectedness and interdependence (Emery 
and Trist 1965) • As a response, and according to Miles 
and Snow (1984): "Organisations of the future are likely 
to be vertically disintegrated: functions typically 
encompassed within a single organisation will instead be 
performed in independent organisations. The functions of 
product design and development, manufacturing, and 
distribution • • • will be brought together and held in 
temporary alignment by a variety of market mechanism.“ 
Achrol (1991) further postulates two new 
organisational forms to cope with the turbulent 
environments: (1) the marketing exchange company or the 
quasi-market, which is essentially an information 
network company organised around consumers and markets, 
and (2) the marketing coalition company, or the quasi-
organisation, which possesses core expertise and 
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develops a formal and stable quasi-organisational 
constellation of economic alliances around it. In both 
organisational forms, strategic and functional alliances 
with upstream and downstream members in the value chain 
are instrumental to their success. Inter-organisational 
relationship within the context of transorganisational 
polity has thus sparked new interest among economists 
and managers• 
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Cooperative Relationships Between Firms 
The upcoming competitive dimension is the multi-
organisational, often multinational, competitive 
strategic alliances (Schill and McArthur 1992). In 
marketing and international business, joint ventures and 
strategic alliances have become important corporate 
vehicles for dealing with market complexity and dynamism 
(Starr 1991)• More joint ventures and alliances have 
been announced since 1981 than in all previous years, 
with the growth rate jumping from 6 to 22 percent 
(Fortune, September 26, 1988, p.52). Hamel, Doz and 
Prahalad (1989) also reported that collaboration between 
competitors is in fashion, as companies can learn and 
benefit from their partners. In the manufacturing 
industry, leaner structure with more outsourcing and 
closer buyer-seller relationship are especially 
important in volatile markets where products are 
frequently re-designed to meet technological competition 
and/or customers‘ preferences. Competitive strategies 
of confrontation (e.g. Porter 1985) appear to have given 
way to cooperative alliances. 
Alliances represent alternative modes of 
organisation between market-mediated exchange and 
internal hierarchy which "go beyond normal market 
transactions but fall short of outright mergers" (Porter 
1985, p57). Thorelli (1986) names this intermediate form 
of organisation as "network" which exist in "a spectrum 
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of arrangements from loose to tight, from arm's length 
bargaining to total integration". The traditional 
transaction cost analysis has been very useful in 
understanding the governance of market-hierarchy 
dichotomy. According to Williamson (1975, 1985), degree 
of uncertainty, frequency of transactions and specific 
assets involved in the transactions together influence 
the costs associated with market contracts. When costs 
rise sufficiently high, market fails and transactions 
are internalised through hierarchical authority. 
Williamson (1991) has also come to a hybrid form of 
governance which combines aspects of market contracting 
and hierarchical authority and falls between the market-
hierarchy continuum. While in legal contract, price 
incentives and administrative control play a role, cost 
minimisation is the dominant control mechanism in the 
hybrid structure. 
The cost-oriented view of the working in the 
market-hierarchy continuum has been challenged in 
different ways. Eccles (1981) used the concept of 
"quasi-firm" to describe the close relationship between 
general contractors and independent subcontractors. 
Ouchi (1984) identified "M-form organisations" in which 
the formal and informal set of relationships between a 
group of interdependent firms takes on characteristics 
of a "clan". Macaulay (1963) introduced relational 
contract theory: exchange parties may not rely on 
structural dependence or the law; instead they place 
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emphasis on the relational consequence of their conduct. 
There are indeed norms essential for successful exchange 
relationship. Macneil (1980) further explained that 
these norms or "principles of right action" bind 
exchange parties and serve to control and regulate 
proper and acceptable behaviour. Jarillo (1988) studied 
strategic network and entrepreneurial firms, in which 
trust and concern for reputation are important control 
devices in sustaining cooperative exchange 
relationships. Powell (1990) has built an argument for 
the network form as "neither market nor hierarchy", 
because of the heavy reliance on reciprocity, 
complementary interdependence, collaboration, reputation 
and relationship basis towards informal climate for 
mutual gain orientation. He also pointed to firms 
engaged in fast-moving industry with short product life 
cycle as more likely engaging in network relationship in 
order to respond speedily to changing technology and 
market conditions. 
As a whole, strategic inter-firm cooperative 
relationships represent a new kind of economic 
organisation which encompasses cost-oriented and norm-
driven governance for explicit goals. Indeed, 
Schermerhorn (1976) described the inter-firm cooperation 
as "the presence of deliberate relations between 
otherwise autonomous organisations for the joint 
accomplishment of individual operating goals". The 
participants who cooperate expect that their joint � 
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effort would potentially attain mutually desirable 
performance goals, and satisfy their mutual interest. 
The relationships are goal-driven, interdependent, time 
specific and specific to their commitment. 
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Supplier Relationship as a Context of Study 
Within the last decade, supplier relationship has 
emerged as a significant issue in the purchasing 
management function of a business enterprise. Purchasing 
is an exchange process through which an organisation 
determines and acquires its material/service resources, 
contributing to the total quality and competitiveness of 
the products/service which the organisation provides in 
pursuing its objectives (Fung 1990)• This process 
requires the purchasing management function to 
simultaneously respond creatively to users' needs and 
develop mutually profitable relationship with 
suppliers. The domain of purchasing is therefore an 
integration of the internal and external exchange 
functions in pursuing organisational goals. ^ 
The contribution of effective purchasing management 
to corporate performance is obvious. On average, 
manufacturing firms spend more than half of their sales 
in the procurement of raw materials and components. The 
cost rationalisation of purchases can thus generate a 
multiplier effect on the profit improvement of a firm 
(Dobler, Burt and Lee 1990) • Moreover, purchasing mix 
decisions concerning quality/price and quantity/time of 
purchased materials directly affect the 
differentiation/cost and speed/responsiveness strategies 
of the finished products. Such decisions, however, can 
only be meaningfully examined in the context of a viable 
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supplier relationship network. Take for example, Cohen 
and Griffiths (1989) analysed the structure of the 
Japanese automobile 'Keiretsu' and suggested that 
supplier partnership along the »co-producer' lines of 
the electronics industry can be a vehicle for 
substantial cost reduction and quality improvement. 
Frazier, Spekman and O'Neal (1988) also described the 
complex patterns of just-in-time exchange relationship 
with suppliers in industrial markets. There has also 
been an increasing amount of work in linking supplier 
relationship with the competitive posture of firms. 
Landeros and Monczka (1989) pointed out that 
understanding the firm's strategy and positioning 
suppliers‘ relationships accordingly is an important 
contribution of purchasing to corporate objectives. 
Stuart's (1993) research supported the notion that as 
buyer/seller partnership increases, the buying firm 
typically benefits in terms of short-time productivity 
improvements and long-term strategic advantages. 
The relationship between buyers and sellers in 
industrial markets can thus be studied in a strategic 
perspective. Bertodo (1991) reports that competitiveness 
cannot be achieved in the 1990s by the Original 
Equipment Manufacturers alone. It is important to align 
key suppliers to the strategic vision of the buying 
firms. Despite anecdotal evidence which suggests the 
strategic implications of supplier relationship, little 
effort has been undertaken to empirically investigate 
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the nature and components of buyer-seller relationship 
in industrial markets, as well as the extent they affect 
the perceived effectiveness of the relationship. This 
relational performance, from the viewpoints of buyers, 
is the perceived suppliers, contribution to the buyers‘ 
competitive business performance. The study here 
represents an effort in this direction, with the 
electronics firms in Hong Kong chosen as a sample of the 
study. 
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Electronics Firms in Hong Kong as a Study Sample 
Clothing, electronics and textiles are the top 
three largest employers and export-earners in the 
manufacturing sector in Hong Kong. In 1993, the 
clothing industry employed 166 401 workers (33% of total 
manufacturing employment) and earned HK$71,857 million 
in exports (32% of Hong Kong‘s total domestic exports)• 
The corresponding figures for electronics industry are 
53 591 workers (11%) and HK$57,333 (25.7%)； and for the 
textiles industry, 44 182 workers (9%) and HK$16,180 
million (7.3%) (Hong Kong Annual Report 1994). 
Manufacturing industries in Hong Kong are also 
characterised by small-scale firms. In 1993, there were 
39 238 manufacturing establishments, of which 34 383 
(87.6%) employed fewer than 20 persons, and 37 415 
(93.4%) fewer than 50 persons (Hong Kong Annual Report 
1994). 
Electronics industry in Hong Kong includes the 
manufacture of a wide variety of electronic components 
(e.g. multi-layer printed circuit boards, liquid crystal 
displays, semi-conductor devices) and consumer 
electronic products (e.g. electronic dictionaries, 
cordless telephones, microcomputers) • The biggest 
export market is the USA, followed by China and Germany 
(Hong Kong Trade Development Council 1990) • The 
industry has also been able to attract a high portion of 
overseas investment. At the end of 1992, out of the 
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HK$37,279 million of direct overseas investment in 
manufacturing in Hong Kong, 31% of it was in the 
electronics industry (Hong Kong Annual Report 1994). 
In terms of value-added, in 1991, electrical and 
electronic products, machinery, professional equipment 
and optical goods industry had overtaken the clothing 
industry to become the industry group that accounted for 
the greatest share (23.4%) of the total value-added of 
the manufacturing sector in Hong Kong (Census and 
Statistics Department Hong Kong 1993) . To maintain 
export growth, Hong Kong electronics manufacturers in 
general have been able to upgrade the industry to 
produce higher-end products which are less subject to 
seasonal irregularities. They are also fast to capture 
the opportunities arising from the worldwide trend of 
computerisation and office automation. (Hong Kong Trade 
Development Council 1990). Appendix A gives some key 
data about the electronics industry in Hong Kong. 
While business growth in the electronics industry 
has been bright for most of the past decade, electronics 
manufacturers nowadays find it increasingly difficult to 
sustain their growth as local production costs increase 
and competition from neighbouring countries is keen. 
Electronic products in general have been shown to have 
relatively short product life cycles. When successful, 
new products normally have high initial rates of growth 
in sales, and the manufacturers must react quickly 
within an environment of potential price erosion. Thus, 
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electronic manufacturers are under constant pressure to 
reduce operating cost and make large investments in 
working capital to support the growth of demand for 
their products. Given that inflation rates in Hong Kong 
has been escalating significantly, growing production 
costs have encouraged manufacturers to re-locate labour 
intensive production processes outside Hong Kong (Mun 
1991) • Under the driving forces of the "Four 
Modernisations" and the ongoing campaign of "economic 
rectification" in China, many Hong Kong companies have 
set up production facilities in the neighbouring 
Guangdong Province in Southern China where an extensive 
pool of cheaper labour is available. 
Re-location of production facilities to achieve 
lower cost has not resolved all the problems regarding 
competitiveness. Recall that electronic products are 
generally having short product life cycles, competition 
in the industry is indeed international and multi-
dimensional in its nature. Customers are continuously 
demanding new and quality products at lower cost, made 
available and supported by good customer services. As a 
response, electronics manufacturing firms have to focus 
on multiple sources of competitive advantages: in cost 
and quality of products, as well as speed and 
responsiveness to market needs. Given that manufacturing 
organisations in Hong Kong are generally small in size 
and lean in structure, relational strategy with 
suppliers for the availability of right quality 
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components is critical for competitive performance. 
Supplier relationship in the electronics industry in 
Hong Kong is here taken as a context and sample for the 
study of the associative relationship between buyer-
seller behaviour and perceived relational performance 
that would eventually affect the international 
competitiveness of the buying firms. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
The previous introduction chapter gives an account 
of the emergence of supplier relationship as a context 
of study, against a backdrop of environmental diversity 
that mandates inter-organisational cooperation. This 
chapter further examines the theoretical issues 
underlying the development of inter-organisational 
cooperation and reviews literature pertaining to the 
establishment of an integrated study framework. In 
brief, the resource-dependence and social ecology 
perspectives of environment-organisation interface 
explain the cooperative form of inter-organisational 
activities. There are also multiple mechanisms for 
governing inter-organisational relationship: in terms of 
cost, structure-dependence and social norms. In 
industrial markets, buyer-seller relationship is 
considered more long-term and stable. Contractual 
supplier relationship often develops into a relational 
governance structure that consists of norms in 
regulating behaviour. The relational performance is 
concerned with how supplier's efforts are perceived to 
have led to buyer' s competitiveness. Moreover, the 
effect of the transactional norms on relational 
performance is moderated by the transorganisational 
structure between the exchange parties. 
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Perspectives of Environment-organisation Interface 
and Inter-organisational Relationship 
The underlying rationale for the study of inter-
organisational relationship derives from the open-system 
premise that organisations must have support and 
feedback from their environments in order to survive. 
Thus, all organisations are seen as systems interacting 
with their environments for inputs which are essential 
to their functioning (Thompson 1967, Katz and Kahn 
1978) • Exchange theorists first recognised that any 
organisation depends on a network of other 
organisations for support and that these organisations 
in turn depend on the organisation for some output 
(Emerson 1962, Blau 1964). A salient part of environment 
confronting an organisation is therefore other 
organisations. Two traditional perspectives have 
emerged regarding the extent to which an organisation is 
dependent on others in its environment. 
First, the population ecology model of 
organisations (Hannan and Freeman 1977, Aldrich 1979) 
argued that investigating strategy only from the 
standpoint of a focal organisation would fail to take 
into account the dynamics that unfold at a population 
level of analysis. In support of the argument, it was 
emphasised that at a macro level, historical, political, 
economic, and social factors determine the fate of the 
whole population of organisations, so that the action of 
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a single organisation counts for little in the long run 
course of events. This environment-organisation 
relationship focused on environment as the primary 
determinant of organisational activities, forms, and 
destinies. The perspective is within a natural 
selection framework in which it is argued that all 
organisations are confronted with a common set of 
resources and constraints. The implication is that 
managers have to attempt to accurately forecast the 
environmental trends in order to match organisational 
capacities to environmental threats and opportunities 
(Child 1972). In this context, surviving organisations 
within a population are in competition With and are 
independent of each others in their functioning. 
Second, the resource-dependence perspective 
(Pfeffer and Salancik 1978) emphasised the scarce and 
valued resources held by environment. It was assumed 
that organisations strive for autonomy and are 
inherently reluctant to enter into relations that reduce 
their freedom to make decisions in achieving their 
objectives. However, an organisation cannot internally 
generate all the needed resources for its survival, and 
must enter into exchange relationships with other 
organisations in the environment in acquiring them. 
Given that environmental resources are in short supply, 
an organisations has to attempt to outmaneuver one 
another in gaining scarce resources. Schmidt and Kochan 
(1977) suggested that resource dependence can result in 
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two types of inter-organisational relationship: (1) 
symmetrical exchanges where both parties perceive mutual 
benefits of the relationship and are motivated to 
interact, and (2) asymmetrical exchanges where only one 
party is motivated and which is powerful to induce the 
other to interact. 
The resource-dependence perspective means that 
exchange relationships are manipulable and are open to 
re-definition. Organisational survival and success are 
not always achieved by internal adjustments, and 
management can actively shape its interdependence with 
the environment through coalitions with other firms. 
Similar to this view is the concept of stakeholder 
management (Ansoff 1965, Freeman 1984), which serves to 
identify groups of constituents who have a legitimate 
claim on a company (e.g. shareholders, creditors, 
suppliers, customers, employees). An organisation has 
to interact strategically with these groups of 
constituents in order to legitimise and stabilise its 
existence. 
The main deficiency of the resource-dependence 
approach in explaining organisational interdependence 
lies on its ego-centric focus on a simple organisation, 
typically examining inter-organisational relationships 
from the viewpoint of a focal organisation. Moreover, 
much of the inter-organisational research in resource-
dependence perspective has been taken place in the 
public sector, where the major concern is on 
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coordination activities between agencies delivering 
related services in a relatively stable environment 
(Aldrich and Whetten 1981)• To improve a study frame for 
the inter-organisational field would therefore require a 
collective perspective as well as a concern for 
environmental uncertainty. 
Environmental uncertainty is a key factor that 
influences the autonomy and control of an organisation. 
Environmental uncertainty has been defined as a lack of 
information about future events, so that alternatives 
and their outcomes are unpredictable (Hickson, Hinings, 
Lee, Schneck and Pennings 1971). Extending this 
definition to the study of exchange relationships, and 
as Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) noted, exchanges are 
necessary but at the same time are sources of 
uncertainty for organisations. Uncertainty does occur 
because the future value of the goods and/or services to 
be exchanged may not be determined precisely and/or may 
not by achieved after an agreement is made. Hence, the 
duration between agreement and commitment gives rise to 
uncertainty and thus the contingencies that must be 
allowed in inter-organisational exchanges. 
The contingency effect arising from uncertainty is 
compounded by the fact that the causal texture of 
organisational environments becomes more turbulent, i.e. 
environments now comprise more densely interconnected 
and interdependent elements (Emery and Trist 1965)• 
Turbulence becomes a problem when organisations act 
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independently, and producing unanticipated and dissonant 
consequences in the overall environment they share. To 
cope with such complex metaproblems, the requisite 
resolution strategy should originate from a shared 
domain in which organisations can collectively maintain 
control over their destinies. 
Towards this end, Emery and Trist (1973) have 
advocated the adoption of a 'social ecological‘ approach 
to the management of inter-organisational relationships. 
Instead of drawing attention to the 'natural‘ 
environment that may shape organisational existence, 
they focus on the establishment of a 'social ‘ 
environment which are collectively constructed and 
controlled. The argument is in favour of a "human 
ecological‘ approach to inter-organisational analysis 
which emphasises a collective form of organisational 
adaptation to the environment. A summary of the 
perspectives of environment-organisation interface and 
concepts of inter-organisational relationship is given 
in Table 2.1. 
Despite the differing perspectives of environment-
organisation interface, it is obvious that it is the 
dynamism of environment that forces organisations to 
adapt and to change. No matter what strategies are 
pursued by organisations in reaction to their perceived 
environmental changes (Silverman 1971), the fact is that 
organisations are more interdependent with each others 
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organisational interdependence thus conceive an 
‘organisation as an entity that needs inputs and produces 
outputs, linking together a number of organisations via 
the mechanism of exchanges or transactions. In the 
business setting, Porter (1985) suggests that the 
linkages are made through a value-chain framework, so 
that a firm can be regarded as of composing 
interconnected value-creation and support activities. A 
firm therefore has to enter into inter-functional and 
inter-organisational coordinations that provide 
opportunities to configurate a competitive business 
system. 
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Development of the Studies of 
• Inter-organisational Relationship 
The previous section concludes that the perception 
of environmental uncertainty and dependence on other 
organisations for resources spur the development of 
inter-organisational relationship. The development 
process as well as the structure of inter-organisational 
behaviour, however, have been studied in different 
perspectives and contexts. 
Early organisational theorists have built on the 
resource-dependence perspective to study voluntary 
exchange relationships between organisations (Levine and 
White 1961), relationships mandated externally (Hall 
Clark, Giordano, Johnson and Van Roekel 1977) and power-
dependence relationships between organisations (Schmidt 
and Kochan 1977) • The research work was mainly 
conducted in the public sector, in which organisations 
are primarily concerned with coordination activities and 
sharing information and resources in delivering related 
services. Researchers generally focused on the 
relationship between resource dependence, coinmunication, 
transaction, and consensus. The scope is best 
illustrated by the work of Van de Ven and Walker (1984). 
In their research in examining the mobilisation 
coordination efforts initiated by fourteen early 
childhood development organisations, it was summarised 
that the growth of an inter-organisational relationship 
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could be viewed as a dynamic cyclical process in which a 
‘need for resources stimulates communication with 
organisations that possessed the needed resources. The 
communication in turn led to the establishing of formal 
agreements for financial transactions or informal 
consensus to refer clients for services. Through 
frequent communication, individuals developed collective 
meanings and definitions of their situation and this 
consensus made transactions possible. When resources 
were exchanged incrementally and if participants 
observed equity in the relationship, trust would 
gradually develop. With exchanges increased over time, 
a greater amount of resource would be needed and this 
gave rise to new inter-organisational relationships. 
Inter-organisational issues have also been studied 
in terms of the nature and forms of linkages (Weick 
1976, Schopler 1987, Luke, Begun and Pointer 1989); 
critical determinants of the formation of different 
types of relationship (Oliver 1990)； structural 
dimensions of intra- and inter-organisational network 
(Lincoln 1982, Aiken and Hage 1968)； complexity of 
inter-organisational network as a political-economy 
(Benson 1975)； as well as relationship outcome of inter-
organisational linkages (Schopler 1987, Miner, Amburgey 
and Stearns 1990). Of particular importance is the 
notion of political-economy framework of inter-
organisational relationship in which it is argued that 
the extent of coordination for economic performance and 
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power-dependence relationship simultaneously explain 
‘exchange behaviour. Interactions between organisations 
thus depend on their respective market positions as well 
as their power-control over flow of resources. In 
determining inter-organisational equilibrium, dimensions 
of domain consensus, ideological consensus, positive 
evaluation and work coordination have been identified 
(Benson 1975)• 
Extensive studies of inter-organisational 
relationships have also taken place outside the 
traditional domain of sociology and organisational 
theory. Reve and Stern (1979) proclaimed that marketing 
has long focused on understanding inter-organisational 
interactions within marketing channels. Indeed, in 
channel research, early empirical work in intra-channel 
processes with reference to power (e.g. Hunt and Nevin 
1974, Etgar 1976, Frazier 1983) and conflict (e.g. 
Brown, Lusch and Muehling 1983, Anderson and Narus 1984) 
have been extended to the study of inter-organisational 
issues in terms of environmental relationships (e.g. 
Dwyer and Welsh 1985, Achrol and Stern 1988), different 
alternative governance modes for channel relationship 
(e.g. Anderson and Coughlan 1986, Klein, Frazier and 
Roth 1990, John 1984, Buchanan 1992), as well as 
communication and influence strategies for performance 
(e.g. Frazier and Summers 1984, Frazier and Rody 1991, 




In business-to-business marketing, notable efforts 
‘are from the International Marketing and Purchasing 
Group (IMP Group) in the study of buyer-seller behaviour 
in an interactive organisational context (Hakansson 
1982) . Founded on a rather 丨 m i x e d ' conceptual base 
comprising theories of resource dependence, social 
exchange and transaction cost economics, the IMP Group 
researched into both the structural and social aspects 
of inter-firm dyads in enacted environment. Their work 
parallels those in channel research in reflecting the 
long-term exchange relationship and political-economy 
framework in handling cooperation and conflict (c.f. 
Anderson and Narus 1984, Stern and Reve 1980) . In 
recent years, the IMP work has also been extended to the 
study of the evolution and culture of business networks 
(Ford 1990). 
Studies of supplier relationship from the 
perspective of purchasing management are limited both in 
scope and quantity. Purchasing historically has been 
regarded as an administrative function in procuring 
material resources (Ansoff 1965)• Hence purchasing 
studies are often characterised by a decision-making 
orientation : in determining right quality, competitive 
price, economic quantity, and required time of 
purchases. Supplier relationship management has gained 
popularity as firms increase outsourcing through 
vertical disintegration (Miles and Snow 1984)； and 
suppliers are regarded as valuable external resources 
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that affect the strategy and competitive position of a 
‘company (Farmer and MacMillan 1976, Landeros and Monczka 
1989) • In industry with accelerating pace of 
technological evolution such as electronics, the search 
for progressively higher quality components gradually 
merge with the simultaneous search for a new kind of 
supplier relationship. The firms concerned cannot 
achieve competitiveness without integrating with their 
suppliers' infra-structure. Strategic supplier selection 
and partnership sourcing are thus evolving concepts in 
purchasing management research (Spekman 1988, Ellram 
1990, Stuart 1993). 
Studies of inter-organisational relationship are 
thus being conducted (1) in an enlarged scale and scope 
- t o include business organisations in addition to 
health and social services organisations as well as a 
network of organisations and (2) to an extended depth — 
to include the political-economic behaviour and 
relational outcome. The study is concerned with the 
nature and outcome of inter-firm relationship in an 
industrial marketing and purchasing context. It is 
necessary at this stage to narrow the focus to the 
governance structure of inter-organisational behaviour, 
as a bridge to an examination of buyer-seller 
relationship in industrial markets. 
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Governance of Inter-firm Relationship 
This section reviews the multiple dimensions of the 
governance structure of inter-firm behaviour, based on 
literature drawn from inter-organisational studies, 
channel research and international industrial buyer-
seller relationships. The relational exchange paradigm 
will subsequently be singled out for a detailed 
investigation, and its association with relational 
outcome will be examined. 
Cost-oriented Inter-firm Relationship 
For long, costs are inevitably incurred in the 
complex process of exchange among organisations. 
Transaction costs are the costs of administering 
exchange: in collecting and analysing information, 
negotiation, contracting and in ensuring performance. 
They are incurred due to market imperfections 
(Williamson 1985), or imperfect coordination between 
buyers and sellers attempting to transact in an 
imperfect world (Noordewier, John and Nevin 1990)• In 
business-to-business exchange settings, uncertainties in 
markets often arise in the context of dynamism and 
munificence of the environment (Achrol and Stern 1988)• 
Researchers examining the effect of environmental 
uncertainties on governance have generally focused on 
( 
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the choice between market-based transactions and 
‘complete vertical integration. (see for example, John 
and Weitz 1988, Klein, Frazier and Roth 1990). The 
transaction cost theory put forward by Williamson (1985) 
identifies the polar alternatives of a governance 
mechanism: price in markets and control through 
authority in hierarchies. The framework explicitly 
regards, cost/efficiency as the fundamental element in 
determining the nature of organisation. 
According to Williamson (1985), hierarchical 
governance through authority is more efficient than 
mark e t-medi a ted exchanges when (1) there is high 
uncertainty concerning individual performance in groups 
and/or future contingencies that complicate writing 
contracts, (2) transactions are frequent and hence 
recontracting is costly, and (3) highly specific assets 
are involved which may increase opportunistic 
tendencies. Under these circumstances, governance by 
authority is argued to replace market exchange to result 
in less costly transactions. 
Governance in the transaction cost analysis thus 
focuses on ownership and control underlying a decision 
to vertically integrate. The basic assumption is that 
participants in market exchanges are boundedly rational 
and opportunistic. Also, because information is often 
impacted, the investing firm needs to safeguard its 
specific investments from the possibility of 
relationship termination or "opportunistic 
( 
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expropriation" (Klein, Crawford, and Alchian 1978)• 
‘There are, however, contingencies underlying the 
transaction cost paradigm. Heide and John (1990) suggest 
that the initial safeguard identified in the transaction 
cost analysis literature is vertical integration. 
However, bilateral governance in the form of joint 
action helps to curb opportunistic inclinations and 
might erode the value of specific investments. In 
examining possible hybrid organisational arrangements 
between markets and formal organisations, i.e. 
hierarchies, Powell (1987) contends that large 
vertically integrated firms may perform quite well when 
mass production, strict routines, and well-specified 
procedures can be used to attack stable and predictable 
markets. However, when organisations are confronted by 
sharp fluctuations in demand and unanticipated changes, 
the liabilities of large scale are exposed. 
In addition to the contingencies underlying 
transaction cost analysis, there also exists practical 
issues on the composition of transaction cost as well as 
the rules and conventions as to which costs are borne by 
whom (Alois 1990) . For example, a supplier may need to 
have a lawyer examine the supply contract, the lawyer's 
fee, however, may be required to be paid by the 
customer. Macneil (1980) describes the rules to 
apportion the costs as 'facit assumptions' which range 
from general ones such as trust to highly specific ones 
such as assumptions about particular and precise trade 
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usage. The power-dependence relationship can also come 
.into play. This lead the governance of inter-firm 
relationship to include structural and social stakes 
that may regulate exchange behaviour. 
Structural Dependence as Governance 
The original framework of transaction cost theory 
presented a market-hierarchy dichotomy. In contrast, 
Grossman and Hart (1986) and others (Perry 1989, Heide 
and John 1992) define vertical integration as control 
over decisions. They argue that the benefits of 
vertical integration stem not from ownership per se, but 
rather, the ability to exercise decision control. 
Intermediate situations in the market-hierarchy 
framework can then be conceptualised in a continuum 
linking arm's length transaction (i.e. no decision 
control) to complete integration (i.e. complete decision 
control)• Within this context, power-dependence plays a 
role in determining inter-firm governance. 
In channel research, the power-dependence framework 
has been employed to examine sources of power, 
conflicts, perceived goal compatibility, trust, 
satisfaction as well as performance goals of cooperation 
and control (see for example, Frazier 1983, Gaski 1984, 
1986, Dwyer and Oh 1988, Heide and John 1988). Applied 
in problem-oriented focus of exchange relationship, 
Campbell (1985) proposed competitive, cooperative and 
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coinmand strategies in coping with industrial buyer-
.seller relationships which are independent, 
interdependent and dependent in nature respectively. In 
a further setting, Anderson and Narus (1984) drew upon 
the work of social exchange theory (Kelley and Thibaut 
1978) and argued that the results of interactions 
between the distributor and manufacturer represented the 
rewards and costs of each participant in the 
interaction. These results were evaluated against the 
quality of the outcome expected by the participants and 
would determine the sustention of relationship and 
perceived dependence levels. 
The structural inducement as a mechanism for 
regulating exchanges parallels the power-dependence 
concept of exchange. Parties may offer credible 
commitments (Williamson 1985) or pledges (Anderson and 
Weitz 1992) to create a self-interest stake for 
regulating conduct in the future. Depending on the 
structure of these commitments, differing governance 
forms can emerge. Mutual commitments from both parties 
lead to bilateral governance while disparate commitments 
make the less committed party possessing more control 
over the relationship (c.f. Schumidt and Kochan 1977). 
For a firm, analysis of dependence structure would help 
to determine the amount of resources that must be 
invested in order to achieve its organisational goals. 
Thibaut and Kelley (1959, Kelly and Thibaut 1978) 
propose that in an interpersonal setting, actors assess 
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a relationship through its costs and benefits. The 
focal actor will continue to invest in a relationship 
provided that there is net value of the relationship, 
and that is greater than or equal to that of available 
alternatives. This implies that norms, or share 
expectations of behaviour evolve as an unplanned 
cooperative process. With a significant amount of 
interactions among participants over time, a social 
exchange process takes place and guides a firm's 
adaptation to its counterpart in a given dependence 
structure. 
Social Governance Structure 
The social stakes that may govern inter-
organisational relationships lie on the norms or 
behaviour shared by the parties. Relational exchange 
theorists first pointed to the role of informal bonds 
and social norms as supplemental enforcement and control 
mechanisms. According to Macauley (1963), exchange 
parties may place emphasis on the relational 
consequences of their conduct, rather than rely on 
structural dependence, or the law. He suggests that 
exchange parties may cultivate and rely on personal 
bonds and social norms to define expectations and guide 
their conduct. Drawing on the relational contract 
theory, Macneil (1980) contends that a number of norms 
I 
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is considered essential for exchange as they serve to 
control and regulate proper and acceptable behaviour. 
Because of the flexible and universal nature of norms as 
a governance mode, they can be applied in a broad 
variety of contexts• 
There is an increasing amount of work to report the 
social characteristics of exchange relationship. It was 
suggested by Noordewier, John and Nevin (1990) that 
under conditions of uncertainty, firms introduce more 
relational elements into their purchasing arrangements, 
and adaptation capabilities of governance structure. 
Powell (1990) views that an economic exchange is 
embedded in a particular social structural context and 
that certain forms of exchange are more dependent on 
relationships, mutual interests, and reputation, as well 
as less guided by a formal structure of authority. 
In this setting, two elements which are critical to 
the development and maintenance of inter-organisational 
relationship are the norms of equity and trust. Drawing 
on the exchange theory, norms of equity refer to the 
degree to which each organisational party judges that 
the other fulfills its commitments and that the 
relationship is worthwhile, equitable, productive and 
satisfying. As applied to inter-organisational 
relationship, these norms of equity are based on the 
assumption that organisations aim to maximise gains and 
minimise losses when becoming involved in an inter-
organisational relationship. These gains and losses are 
• I 
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generally not calculated in an objective way. Instead, 
as Silverman (1971) pointed out, costs and benefits are 
symbolically assessed in terms of the values and 
meanings assigned by the participants. Thus, as long as 
the parties perceive that their exchanges are equitable, 
they are willing to increase their dependence on each 
other and to become more deeply involved in the inter-
organisational relationship. 
Norm of trust is defined as an expectation that 
alleviates the fear that one's exchange partner will act 
opportunistically, and incorporates social norms of 
obligation and cooperation (Bradach and Eccles 1989)• 
The development of trust and exchange reciprocity 
generally contribute to increased coordination and 
stability in exchange relationships. Norms of equity 
and trust are thus evolving concepts. Van de Ven and 
Walker (1976) posit that inter-organisational 
relationships are likely to emerge incrementally, 
initially require little trust as they involve little 
risk. As the transactions are repeated through time and 
meet basic norms of equity, the participants develop 
trust and feel increasingly secure to commit more 
resources to their relationship. 
In examining buyer-seller relationship, contractual 
and social forms of control need to be examined 
simultaneously. Black (1975) prophesies that "law varies 
inversely with other social control". Macauley (1963) 
contends that reliance on law lessens the chance of 
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future interaction. Gundlach and Achrol (1992) measure a 
set of five relational elements to characterise the 
social norms governing manufacturer-distributor exchange 
relationships under a simulation model• They contend 
that governance of exchange relationships through social 
norms containing relational elements is inversely 
related to the use of legal contracts containing 
elements which simulate the operation of a hierarchy. 
In other settings, researchers also examined the 
dynamics of law and social norms at different stages of 
exchange relationship (Macauley 1963)• The result 
suggests that the prudent use of legal contract would be 
seen particularly relevant during the early stage of 
exchange relationship where the necessary level of 
interaction required to establish norm-based governance 
is absent. However, as relationship develops over time, 
norms manifest themselves and reliance and resort to 
legal contract for governing exchange might be 
correspondingly reduced. Ford (1986) contends that there 
exist a relationship cycle for buyer-seller interactions 
in industrial markets. Dwyer, Schurr and Oh (1987) also 
develop an evolution model of buyer-seller relationship, 
comprising stages of (1) awareness - unilateral 
evaluation of the value of potential exchange partners, 
(2) exploration 一 attraction, communication and 
bargaining, (3) expansion — norms, particularly trust 
developed to guide future relationship development (4) 
I 
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commitment - shared value to support joint investment 
and (5) dissolution 一 break-up. 
As a summary to this section, a review of the 
literature in the governance structure of inter-firm 
relationship confirms that multi-dimensional variables 
are involved. Table 2.2 gives a list of the supporting 
literature for the multiple governance modes. One 
evolving perspective is that there is combined nature 
and application of the different governance mechanisms 
of price, authority, power-dependence, law and norms. 
For example, Bradach and Eccles (1989) explored the 
plural forms of governance and contended, "In contrast 
to conventional approaches that view market and 
hierarchy as mutually exclusive control mechanisms, we 
argue that price, authority and trust are independent 
and can be combined in a variety of ways. “ The authors 
cited evidence in market, intra-organisational and 
personal exchanges and explored how price mechanisms are 
sometimes built into hierarchies, and how authority 
mechanisms often bind independent exchange parties in a 
market. Stinchcombe (1985) also documented the 
simultaneous use of market and authori ty-driven 
governance in different industries. Eccles (1981) 
studied the homebuilder ‘ s market and also found that 
relationships between general contractors and 
subcontractors were governed by both market forces and 
trust. There are also anecdotal evidence of multiple 
governance mechanisms in franchise relationships. 
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Table 2.2 
SELECTED LITERATURE ON THE DIFFERENT GOVERNANCE MECHANISMS 
OF INTER-ORGANISATIONAL RELATIONSHIP 
Governance Modes Supporting Literature from 
Different Contexts 
Cost/efficiency mode under John and Weitz (1988) 
transaction cost analysis Williamson(1975,1985,1991) 
Noordewier, John and Nevin 
(1990) 
Klein, Frazier and Roth (1990) 
Heide and John (1992) 
Power Dependence Benson (1975� 




Social contracting and norms Macneil (1980) 
Bradach and Eccles (1989) 
Hallen, Johnson 
and Seyed-Mohamed (1991) 
Thibaut and Kelley (1959,1968) 
Macauley (1963) 
Hakansson (1982) 
Dwyer Schurr and Or (1987) 
Others e.g. contract and long- Klein, Crawford 








An alternative perspective addresses the evolution 
of cost and power-dependence governances to norm-driven 
structure of inter-firm behaviour. The notion 
originates from the emergent nature of norms (Axelrod 
1984, 1986) and is reinforced by exchange theory (Homan 
1958) and social exchange theory (Blau 1964, Emerson 
1962) . An argument can then be formulated: inter-firm 
interactions will lead to reciprocal adaptations to meet 
needs of the exchange parties, giving rise to more 
stable relationship (c.f. Hakansson 1982). In examining 
237 buyer-seller relationships in the European business 
markets, Hallen, Johanson and Seyed-Mohamed (1991) 
hypothesised that power dependence initiated adaptations 
by one party, which in turn were reciprocated by 
adaptations by the other party. Inter-firm adaptations 
can thus start with inbalanced dependence between the 
parties and subsequently reinforced by a social exchange 
process. Business relationship thus includes social 
aspects which evolve as participants carry out 
activities directed toward one another and exchange 
valuable resources, as illustrated in Figure 2.1. Table 
2.3 gives the supporting literature to the two 
approaches to the determination of governance modes • 
Figure 2.2 shows the incremental logic of social norms 
governance which will be adopted in the study. 
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Figure 2.1 
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN POWER-DEPENDENCE AND SOCIAL EXCHANGE 
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APPROACHES TO THE DETERMINATION OF 
GOVERNANCE MODES 
Governance Modes Supporting Literature 
Combined nature of Eccles (1981, 1985) 
control mechanisms Gundlach and Achrol (1992) 
Stern and Reve (1980) 
Stinchcombe (1985) 
Heide and John (1992) 
Borys and Jemison (1989) 
Powell (1990) 
Emergence of social Homan (1958) 
norms as dominating Blau (1964) 
mode through social Emerson (1962) 
exchange process. Thibaut and Kelley (1959) 
Kelley and Thibaut (1978) 
Van de Ven and Walker (1984) 

























































































































































Norms^ Relationalism and Relational Performance 
Incremental development of social governance 
structure of inter-firm relationship points to the 
importance of norms or shared expectations regarding 
behaviour (Axelrod 1986, Macneil 1980, Thibaut 1968). 
In this context, norms represent important social and 
organisational vechicles of control when goals are long-
term or open-ended. They provide a frame of reference 
against which appropriate behaviour under uncertain 
situations is to be evaluated. 
Norms differ in their content and orientation from 
one setting to another. For instance, norms have been 
found to differ significantly in the extent to which 
they prescribe behaviour directed towards collective as 
opposed to individual goals (Thibaut and Kelley 1959)• 
Macneil,s (1980) typology of "discrete" versus 
"relational" norms reflects this difference. According 
to Macneil, discrete norms represent individualist or 
competitive interaction between exchange parties, while 
relational norms contemplate cooperative and bilateral 
strategies of the parties. Mohr and Nevin‘s (1990) 
research on the contingency theory of communication in 
marketing channels applies the concept to differentiate 
"market structure" with "relational structure" of 
channels in a relationalism continuum. 
In Macneil,s (1980) typology, the concept of 
"relationalism" may be manifested in several different 
I 
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though related domains such as flexibility, solidarity, 
and information exchange. Noordewier, John, and Nevin 
(1990) contend that relationalism can be appropriately 
viewed as an underlying syndrome or a higher order norm, 
which gives rise to other more domain-specific ones. 
Despite these conceptual analyses, empirical work based 
on the ideas of a discrete-relational continuum is 
scarce, part of the difficulty is that the conceptual 
analyses do not offer a clear set of operational 
dimensions. 
Relationalism does not exist in a context-free 
vacuum. It must be operationalised in the context of a 
specific exchange. To operationalise, norms must be 
dimensionalised. Heide and John (1992) argue that inter-
firm norms are multidimensional in that they may relate 
to particular kinds of behaviour. Macneil (1980) offers 
a large set of about 28 overlapping dimensions. 
Stinchcombe (1985) gives a smaller set of dimensions, 
but they are centered around "simulating the operation 
of hierarchies". Drawing on the work of Macneil (1980), 
and Kaufmann and Stern (1991) , Noordewier, John and 
Nevin (1990) specified the dimensions of relationalism 
in terms of five elements: supplier flexibility, 
supplier assistance, information provided to supplier, 
monitoring of supplier, and expectation of continuity. 
They modeled the above five elements as comprising a 
syndrome of relational governance (or relationalism), 
which can be thought of as a single higher order 
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construct. In studying conflict resolution processes in 
contractual channel of distribution, Dant and Schul 
(1992) evaluated the impact of norms of solidarity, role 
integrity and mutuality on the use of conflict 
resolution mechanisms. 
When norms can be operational i sed to reflect the 
degree of relational!sm, their association with 
relational performance needs to be examined. A number of 
empirical research have been undertaken to study the 
relationship between social norms/relationalism and 
relational performance. Recall that norms as shared 
expectations over exchange behaviour also serve as a 
basis for achieving goals. In research addressing the 
impact of relational norms on facets of exchange 
performance, Kaufmann and Stern (1988, 1991) showed that 
the presence of the social norm of solidarity tends to 
dampen perceived unfairness in commercial exchanges. 
Similarly, Noordewier, John and Nevin (1990) reported 
that OEM purchase performance increases where elements 
of relational exchange are present. In their survey on 
performance outcomes of purchasing arrangements in 
industrial buyer-vendor relationship, it has been tested 
that when environmental uncertainty is high, buyers‘ 
inventory and administrative performance is enhanced by 
effecting a corresponding increase in the relational 
content of the governance structure, whilst performance 




In an empirical test of the role of norms in 
structuring economically efficient relationships between 
independent firms, Heide and John (1992) summarised that 
a positive effect of buyer-specific assets on decision 
control over the supplier is contingent on a relatively 
high level of relational norms. Accordingly, they 
recommended that supportive norms have significant 
economic value when specific assets need to be 
safeguarded. In the array of marketing channel 
relationship, a research on manufacturer-distributor 
exchange relationship conducted by Gundlach and Achrol 
(1992) gave the result that the presence of norms 
containing relational content would seem to enhance 
perceptions of performance. Alternately, they argued 
that the use of contractual terms for maintenance of a 
relationship would lessen performance evaluations. 
According to Kumar, Stern and Achrol (1992), 
performance entails a variety of dimensions surrounding 
the effectiveness with which each partner performs its 
role. An important aspect of performance in the context 
of exchange relationships is the level of effort 
provided by a firm toward fulfilling the objectives and 
goals of an exchange partner. Dimensions of "relational 
performance", in the marketing channel context, include 
the effort displayed by a firm in providing market 
access, functional support and/or sales for a partner, a 
firm's knowledge of its market, as well as a firm's 
propensity to make decisions which contribute to the 
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goals of a partner (Kuman, Stern and Achrol 1992) • In 
organisational purchasing, dimensions of relational 
performance from buyer‘s perspective are usually linked 
to suppliers‘ contribution towards buyers‘ strategic 
objectives such as overall total cost reduction, quality 
improvement, product innovation and higher degree of 
speed and responsiveness, which constitute sustainable 
competitiveness. 
Recall that relational performance is defined as 
the effort provided by an exchange partner in addressing 
the need of its partner through its decisions. It can be 
stated that fulfilled expectations extending from an 
exchange partner's efforts in a relationship reinforces 
subsequent expected behaviour, i.e. norms. The idea is 
similar to that of Frazier (1983) • According to his 
research on inter-organisational exchange behaviour in 
marketing channels, he suggested that exchange partners 
will begin forming perceptions of the other firm's role 
performance once the exchange process starts. Role 
performance will influence each firm's dependence on the 
relationship, as it will influence the level of expected 
rewards (relational performance) and the rewards 
actually achieved from the exchange. Frazier (1983) note 
that if an exchange partner's performance is largely 
blamed, perceptions of its role performance by the other 
party will be adversely affected and the level of 
cooperation in the subsequent relationship may be 
relatively low. 
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Norms, Transorganisational Structure and Performance 
While recognising transactional norms serve to 
achieve relational performance that would contribute to 
organisational goals, their association can however be 
further investigated in terms of how inter-
organisational structure and communication may intervene 
the process. The notion is that inter-firm dyad can 
also be conceptualised as an organisation, the structure 
of which will affect its performance (c.f. Adlderson 
1965, Anderson 1982). Hutt, Mokwa and Shapiro (1986), 
for example, treat the market as an inter-firm 
organisation, and this implies the need for the study of 
market as an organisational form. This section borrows 
literature from organisational theory regarding 
structure-performance relationship and extends the 
argument to examine the possible intervening effect of 
inter-firm structure on relational performance. 
Organisational theorists have long been concerned 
with the impact of organisational design on performance 
(See for example, Dalton, Todor, Spendolini, Fielding 
and Porter 1980 for a review) • The two traditional 
approaches to studying the design-performance 
relationship in organisation have been contingency 
research and neo-Weberian research. Contingency research 
has examined the relationship between organisational 
environment and individual performance. The rationale is 
that the environment places certain requirements on the 
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firm and some organisational structures permit more 
effective coping than others. However, some researchers 
have argued that it is not just the interplay between 
the environment and the structure that influences 
performance. Structures may have direct effects not 
contingent on the environment (Child 1974)• Instead, the 
internal consistency, or congruence, of structural 
elements are important in determining performance 
(Khandwalla 1973, 1977) . This lead to the neo-Weberian 
research which studied the relationship between 
performance and organisational size, complexity, 
formalisation, and centralisation (Pugh, Hickson, 
Hinings and Turner 1968)• 
Unfortunately, neither of these approaches give an 
exact picture on structure-performance relationship and 
help to determine decisions on organisational design. In 
this context, Tichy, Tushman, and Fombrun (1979) suggest 
that macro level organisational design characteristics 
do not directly influence group performance. Their 
influence on performance is moderated by group level 
characteristics, in that organisational design affect 
communication and hence information processing 
capability of the organisation. In an effort to advance 
the study of the above perspective, Pearce and David 
(1983) offer both a conceptualisation of a moderated 
design-performance relationship and a set of literature-
derived hypotheses to serve as guides for empirical 
research. A social network approach has been employed 
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in their investigation into the relationship between 
organisational design and group performance, with the 
group structural properties as moderating variables. A 
number of group structural properties, for example^ on 
connectedness and reciprocity, are identified and 
categorised as descriptive of the group or descriptive 
of individuals, whereas organisational design is defined 
on the mechanistic-organic continuum (Burns and Stalker 
1961) • The findings are that mechanistic organisational 
structures generally have a negative impact on employee 
performance because of unfavourable impact of structure 
on group structure variables, while the organic 
structures has a vice-versa effect. Their research 
suggests that organisational design influences group 
performance through its impact on group structure 
variables or ties. This conceptual development in an 
intra-organisational setting can in fact be extended to 
an inter-organisational scope. 
Research on intra一organisational ties and exchanges 
has a long history. Organisational researchers have 
been constant to devote considerable time and effort to 
the study of formal structures. Much of the empirical 
work has been on 'distributional' terms which focus on 
departmentalisation or on the arrangement of positions 
and subunits in firms. As pointed out by Shrader, 
Lincoln and Hoffman (1989) , the chief weakness of this 
traditional approach is that it neglects the internal 
network structure that determines the configuration of 
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relationships among organisational subunits. Earlier, 
Lincoln (1982) called for a new series of large-sample, 
comparative surveys of organisations in "network" rather 
than "distributional" terms, which contrast the 
classical contingency paradigm with contextual 
determinants on structure. 
The conception of structure as network stresses the 
interactive relationship among organisational members 
(Ranson, Hinirigs and Greenwood 1980, Tichy and Fombrun 
1979)• Similarly, Lincoln (1982) defines social network 
as a well-defined set of actors which are linked to one 
another through a set of social relationship. Burns and 
Stalker's (1961) study of British electronics and rayon 
producers particularly indicates the network properties 
of organisational structures. Their distinction between 
"mechanistic" and "organic" organisational forms is 
largely centered on differences in network, not 
distributional structures (Tichy and Fombrun 1979)• 
Against the backdrop of mechanistic versus organic 
structures, Shrader, Lincoln and Hoffman (1989) have 
conducted a survey on 36 agencies, with respect to 
hypotheses that relate four network structural 
properties of density, connectivity, syinmetrY, and 
clustering to the distributional properties of 
differentiation, formalisation, and centralisation, 
against the task contingency variables of size, age, 
technology, and professionalisation. While mechanistic 
structure suggests high differentiation of positions, 
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Normalisation of rules and procedures, and 
centralisation of decision of making, they expect a 
lower density and connectivity in the corresponding 
networks, as well as greater clustering and a s Y m m e t r y of 
ties. 
A few students of inter-organisational relations 
have measured inter-organisational links as the sum of 
the interpersonal links spanning the boundaries of two 
organisations (Hall, John, Peggy, Johnson and Martha 
1977) • Similarly, Lincoln (1982) views that inter-
organisational ties are merely aggregates of boundary-
spanning inter-individual or positional ties. In 
addition, inter-organisational network is defined as the 
total pattern of inter-relationship among a cluster of 
organisations that are meshed together as a social 
system to attain collective and self-interest goals, 
whereas a social system is said to be created when two 
or more organisations become involved in a relationship 
(Van de Ven and Ferry 1980)• With regard to the type of 
inter-organisational structure. Van de Ven and Ferry 
(1980) suggest that the dimensional method of defining 
and studying structure has the major advantages of 
inclusiveness and generality so that analysts can 
incorporate the complete array of alternative profiles 
of inter-organisational structure. This would provide 
greater potential for drawing inferences from one study 
to the next. From this perspective, they identify four 
dimensions which appear to capture the structural 
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essence of an inter-organisational network: 
formalisation, complexity, centralisation, and 
intensity. Drawing on the intra-organi sational 
literature of other theorists, Van de Ven and Ferry 
(1980) apply the first three dimensions to inter-
organisational studies, whilst the fourth dimension i.e. 
intensity, has been drawn from the work of Marrett 
(1971) as an indicator of the degree of activity in the 
network. The way in which they apply to 
"dimensionalise" inter-organisational network structure 
is similar to that of the work proposed by Achrol 
(1992) . According to his study of strategic marketing 
alliances, Achrol suggests that density, 
differentiation, centralisation, formalisation and 
autonomy are the dimensions of the operating structure 
that can be termed transorganisational structure. Figure 
2.3 gives an account of the main research on network 
structure and performance extended to inter-
organisational studies. 
Despite the fact that there is no direct evidence 
on the relationship between inter-organisational 
structure and relational performance, however, we recall 
that organisational design influences performance 
through its impact on group structural properties. 
Moreover, the study of intra-organisational structure in 
a network approach stresses the configuration of 
relations among organisational members and subunits 
(Shrader, Lincoln and Hoffman 1989)• Extending these 
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Figure 2.3 
MAIN RESEARCH ON NETWORK STRUCTURE AND PERFORMANCE 
EXTENDED TO INTER-ORGANISATIONAL STUDIES 
Size Differentiation Density 
Age ——Centralisation Connectivity 
Technology Formalisation Clustering 
Professionalisation Symmetry 
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Source: Shrader, Lincoln and Hoffman (1989) 
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• liaisons > Performance 
Organic connectedness — 
design centrality 
differentiation 
Source: Pearce and David (1983) 
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conceptual ideas to an inter-organisational context, we 
may assume that there is relationship between inter-
organisational relationship (in a network form) and 
relational performance. Shrader, Lincoln and Hoffman 
(1989), in particular, suggest a research agenda to 
evaluate the implications of mechanistic/organic network 
structures for organisational effectiveness. When 
applying to the broad sense of this conceptual model, 
however, instead of considering a direct impact of 
inter-organisational structure on relational 
performance, we posit that inter-organisational 
structure plays its role as a moderating variable by 
which the relationship between social norms and 
relational performance is being intervened. The extended 
view of the inter-organisational network structure will 
be used in the design of the conceptual framework for 
the study. 
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Supplier Relationship and Relational Performance 
This concluding session of the review of literature 
chapter focuses on supplier relationship and relational 
performance, and summarises relevant context research as 
a bridge to the set-up of conceptual framework for the 
study. In purchasing management literature, procurement 
or acquisition of material resources to support 
operations has historically been considered an 
administrative function which bears a decision-making 
focus for its implementation. Buyers ‘ decisions are on 
right quality, competitive prices, economic quantity and 
required time； with supplier evaluation and selection 
being an important complement to these decisions 
(Dobler, Burt and Lee 1990) . In recent years, 
techniques for supplier evaluation and selection have 
developed into a broader context of supplier base 
management, in line with the worldwide trend of 
increasing outsourcing as well as partnership sourcing 
for competitive advantage. The underlying rationale is 
that with global economy and fragmented international 
markets, organisations tend to be vertically 
disintegrated and hold a large set of specialised 
supplier organisations (c.f. Miles and Snow 1984), in 
order to flexibly respond to market needs. Moreover, 
long-term cooperative supplier relationship appears to 
produce more net benefits for the exchange parties than 
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are available from traditional price-based transactions 
(Ellram 1990, Stuart 1993). 
From the perspective of buyers in manufacturing 
industry, a reduction of total acquisition cost of input 
materials contributes directly to the low-cost 
production objective of the firm. In turn, the 
competitive advantage of the low-cost producer can be 
translated into major opportunities for the firm in the 
marketplace. There are abundant examples to show that 
purchase cost containment is a competitive driver in the 
business. Rajagopal and Bernard (1993) reported that 
the purchasing function has a key strategic role in 
bringing a "all-in-cost" approach to complement other 
forms of competitiveness such as product differentiation 
and time-based competition. In industry, collaborative 
relationship with suppliers in determining 
specifications/price trade-offs can often lead to lower 
acquisition cost. Strategic partnership with suppliers 
also allows the buying firm to reduce the transaction 
cost, and to focus on improving the total supply system 
and reduce the total cost of ownership. 
Purchasing‘s cost rationalisation effort may also 
lead to a new kind of supplier relationship. On the one 
hand, cost saving projects may change the supplier 
portfolio, that is, suppliers who are unable or 
unwilling to meet cost objectives will exit and new 
suppliers may become viable. On the other hand, 
suppliers who are committed to work with buyers on total 
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purchase cost reduction will build stronger relationship 
with buyers and hence the possibility of having more 
joint cost-saving projects in future. 
Quality conformance and cost improvement are 
complementary concepts. To compete effectively in 
global markets, a firm has to produce quality products 
at reasonable cost. This often requires the firm to 
manage a reliable network of competent and quality-
oriented suppliers (Burt 1989)• Parallel to the 
objective of quality conformance is quality improvement 
of input materials that commensurate the strategic 
posture of product differentiation of the firm. 
Landeros and Monczka (1989) contend that conventional 
price-driven purchasing tactics will not generally 
contribute to the organisational success of a 
manufacturing firm emphasising product differentiation. 
Instead, cooperative relationships with selected 
suppliers that are capable and willing to conduct 
relevant research and development work on their products 
should permit the buying firm to acquire technologically 
advanced products. In hi-technology industries such as 
computers and semiconductors, component suppliers 
generally possess higher-end technology and buyers‘ 
technology network with component suppliers can 
especially be an effective entry barrier (Ernst and 
O'Connor 1992). From purchasing's perspective, thorough 
review of potential suppliers should include an 
assessment of the potential fit between the buyer‘s and 
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the suppliers ‘ commitment to quality and cost 
improvements over time. 
Also important is the potential contribution of 
suppliers to the total lead time improvement of buyers. 
Time-based competition is especially important to buying 
companies operating in the international marketplace 
(Stalk and Hout 1990)• Research of Handfield (1993) 
confirmed that the impact of total lead time derived 
from reduced set-ups and smaller lot-size in production 
appears to be minimal compared with the time lost due to 
poor supplier performance. In contrast, cooperative 
buyer-seller relationship utilises joint problem-solving 
efforts and both parties may develop faster response to 
market changes. Buyer firms, in particular, may be able 
to deliver within shorter and reliable lead time 
constraints, and to be responsive to changing customers‘ 
needs. 
In recognition of the benefits of cooperative 
buyer-seller relationship, many new forms of supplier 
relationships have emerged, embracing long-term 
contracts, joint venture, technology cooperative 
agreement and dedicated supplier arrangements such as 
just-in-time delivery agreements. (Imrie and Morris 
1992) • Review of purchasing management literature that 
link cooperative buyer-seller behaviour and competitive 
postures of firm also leads to the dimensions of buyer-
seller relationships. Pilling and Zhang (1992) 
summarise them as cooperation/mutuality, information 
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sharing, equity, professionalism, results orientation 
and interaction style. They also contend that 
cooperative exchange carries both reward and risk, as 
relationship simultaneously brings incentive and 
opportunity for opportunistic behaviour. Table 2.4 
gives a list of the key empirical research on supplier 
relationship benefits and main dimensions of cooperative 
behaviour. Of particular significance is the emphasis 
placed on information sharing in defining relationship. 
This suggests the intervening effect of inter-firm 
structure on relational outcome. Extending the 
literature of inter-firm governance and supplier 
relationship management, the study proposes to examine 
in-depth, from the perspective of buyers, the 
association between buyer-seller social norms and 
relational performance towards competitiveness. 
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Table 2 . 4 
SUMMARY OF KEY EMPIRICAL RESEARCH 
WORK IN BUYER-SELLER RELATIONSHIP 
Authors Methodology/Sample Main Findings , 
Noordewier, John 140 OEM purchasers Under conditions of 
and Nevin (1990) uncertainty, firms introduce 
more relational elements that 
enhance cost performance 
LanderOS and Field interviews Define attributes of 
Monczka (1989) with 50 purchasing cooperative buyer-seller 
managers relationship which lead to the 
firms ‘ competitiveness in cost 
and quality; communication 
linkages are in^ortant 
Gales and 320 pairs of Characteristics of wholesaler-
Blackburn (1990) relationship retailer relationship 
between hardware especially in formality of 
wholesalers and relationship and communication 
retailers intensity; en^hasis on the 
iir5>ortance of inter-firm 
communication channel 
Spekman (1991) 160 buyers in the Aspects on management of Asian 
USA suppliers； cooperation and 
conmunication are in a cycle. 
Heide and John 155 buyers and 60 Norms significantly affect the 
(1992) suppliers relationship between specific 
assets and control 
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Table 2.4 (Cont'd) 
SUMMARY OF KEY EMPIRICAL RESEARCH 
WORK IN BUYER-SELLER RELATIONSHIP 
Authors Methodology/Sample Main Findings 
Heide and John 155 buying firms Transaction cost approach in 
(1990) terms of specific asset as a 
measurement of closeness of 
buyer-seller relationship 
O'Neal (1989) 46 Suppliers in Describe the relational 
automobile industry variables in terms of long-
term relationship, openness in 
communication, etc• 
Pilling and 213 buyers in the Match the relationship 
Zhang (1992) aerospace and dimensions e.g. of mutuality, 
electronics information sharing with 
industries relational types (closeness of 
relationship) 
Stuart (1993) 240 buyers from Testing a supplier partnership 
different model that confirms the 
industries strategic benefits of 
relationship. 
Handfield (1993) Interviews of Supplier lead time a major 
purchasing managers competitive tool and 
in 35 firms in the in^jlication of strategic 
USA & Canada sourcing considering 
especially information sharing 
and mutuality. 
Han, Wilson and 41 buyers and 44 Mutual trust and satisfaction 
Dant (1993) suppliers govern the on-going 
relationship； overdependence 




The preceding chapter on literature review focuses 
on the emergence of a relational governance mode of 
inter-firm behaviour in light of environmental 
uncertainty and turbulence. A rationale has also been 
established to examine the relationship between 
relationalism and relational performance. Extending 
this to the study of buyer-seller relationship in 
industrial markets, and from the perspective of the 
buyer, relational norms need to enhance the perceived 
supplier's contribution to buyer's competitiveness in 
order to sustain. Measures of buyer-seller relationship 
are, however, multi-dimensional. Furthermore, literature 
in organisation and management suggests the impact of 
organisational structure on corporate performance. The 
notion can be projected into the study of how 
transorganisational structure moderate the relational 
performance of inter-firm relationship. This chapter 
extends the literature review into a conceptual model 
and describes the hypotheses and methodology for its 
investigation. The objectives and scope of study will 
firstly be elaborated, followed by description of the 
conceptual framework. Hypotheses will be then set based � 
on literature and empirical cases in industry. 
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Purpose of Study 
The purpose of the study is to investigate the 
extent social-norm governance structure affects the 
perceived relational performance in an industrial 
purchasing setting, as specified in a conceptual model 
that will be presented in a later section. Electronics 
industry in Hong Kong is chosen as the study sample as 
it is facing more turbulent environment and severe 
international competition. Strategic supplier 
relationship provides competitive edge for the buying 
firms and hence potential to improve their corporate 
performance. 
The underlying assumption of the study is that 
under environmental uncertainty and turbulence, exchange 
parties, i.e. buyers and sellers, will find the market-
hierarchy dichotomy an insufficient governance mode for 
their relationship. Despite efforts to define hierarchy 
as vertical integration or control over decision (Perry 
1989, Heide and John 1992) and craft the market-
hierarchy relationships along a continuum through for 
example carefully designed contracts, possible 
contingencies impacting future exchange relationships 
remain (Macneil 1980)• While recognising the limitation 
of contractual terms to "presentiate" exchange into the 
future, relational exchange theorists point to the role 
of informal bonds and social norms as an enforcement and 
control mechanism. 
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The evolution of social norms also arise from 
market failure, when transaction cost analysis does not 
capture the essence of the mechanism that regulates 
transaction. The traditional power-dependence concept 
of exchange has been found to play a role, but as time 
elapses, such a structural inducement would give way to 
reciprocity and shared expectations, i.e. norms in 
governing relationship (Van de Ven and Walker 1984, 
Hallen, Johanson and Seyed-Mohamed 1991) • In other 
words, a significant amount of interactions is 
hypothesised to be a central requisite of norm 
formation. 
Social norms governing buyer-seller contractual 
relationship are thus a major concern in the study. 
Acting as blueprints, social norms provide the necessary 
flexibility of exchange in light of contingencies not 
contemplated through contracts. Moreover, norms serve 
as a basis for achieving goals and are instructed 
towards satisfaction of needs. Hence participants in 
exchange will develop normative structures which mirror 
their desired outcomes (Macneil 1980) • It is therefore 
important to recognise the relational outcomes of norms. 
Also, given that organisational structure is framework 
of management of inter-firm relationship, the study 
overall is to examine the moderating effect of inter-
firm structure on relational performance. These 
conceptual linkages among transactional norms, 
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relational structure and performance lead to the 
following important research questions : 
(1) What are the factors that contribute to the 
individual use of norms in the buyer-seller 
context? 
(2) What are their subsequent impact on perceived 
performance as moderated by the inter-
organisational structure? 
In the context of Hong Kong, there is also a 
rationale to select firms in the electronics industry 
for the empirical work. Electronic products are 
characterised as of relatively short product life cycle: 
manufacturers must react quickly to demand growth if 
maximum profit potential is to be realised within an 
environment of potential price erosion. In a more macro 
picture, electronics industry worldwide is regarded as a 
strategic industry central to industrial transformation. 
International competition is based not only on 
technological development but also on improving total 
factor productivity rather than just labour 
productivity. Reduction of inventory costs and 
improvement of quality and logistics are crucial to a 
firm's velocity in global order fulfillment (Ernest and 
O‘Connor 1992)• Hence strategic relationships with key 
suppliers towards goals of continuous improvement in 
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cost, quality and lead time are paramount. Management 
of supplier networks is indeed a strategic issue that 
implies entry barriers and provides economies of scale. 
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Scope of the Study 
Studies of inter-organisational relationship cut 
across a wide spectrum of inter-related concepts that 
exist at different levels: environment (e.g. diversity, 
uncertainty),industry (e.g. competition, concentration), 
company (e.g. interdependence, interconnectedness), and 
operation/individuals (e.g. choice of power, cultural 
characteristics) . In light of the objectives of the 
study as well as the underlying assumptions, and to 
allow in-depth examination of the conceptual model, a 
cros s-sectional social governance variables of inter-
firm relationship is taken as the explanatory variables 
for relational performance that may lead to 
competitiveness. The evolution process of the norms 
structure will not be addressed as this will have to 
require a more longitudinal type of study (c.f. Axel rod 
1986). 
The study is one of a dyadic relationship in 
industrial markets. The study of a dyad can help to 
gain an in-depth understanding (Hall, Clark, Giordano, 
Johnson, Van Roekel 1977, Van de Ven 1976). 
Examination of a dyadic relationship also serves as a 
first step to our understanding of ‘ network ‘ or complex 
web of relationships among organisations (Paulson 1983)• 
As Aldrich and Whetton (1981) acknowledged, "The 
starting point for all studies of aggregates of 
organisations is a relation or transaction between two 
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organisations". It should be especially noted that in 
line with the rationale derived from literature on 
inter-organisational conflict/cooperation, only 
perceived relational performance should be taken into 
account as the effect of social norms exhibited in 
transactions (c.f. Gundlach and Achrol 1992). The 
contribution of the study is not to examine how 
relationships lead directly to competitive business 
performance of a firm (c.f. Noordewier, John and Nevin 
1990) . Instead, perception of how one's partner's 
performance lead to his own performance is the object of 
study. 
The scope of the study involves one from the 
perspective of the buying organisation, in assessing the 
supplier relationship and the resulting relational 
performance. The environmental uncertainties 
confronting .the industry, a (minimum) duration of the 
relationship and degree of competitiveness in the supply 
market (sole-source status is excluded) are all to some 
extent controlled towards a refined scope of study. 
Only the perception and the psychometric variables are 
investigated. The approach does not simply facilitate 
responses in the survey, it also addresses the perceived 
nature of relationship (Scheer and Stern 1992), as well 
as the relational competitive performance under study. 
In industrial marketing and purchasing research, 
the concept of the buying centre(Robinson, Farris and 
Wind 1967, Johnston and Bonoma 1981) affects 
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significantly our understanding of the complex 
interactions and hence relationship management in 
industrial buying. The approach of the study will 
therefore have to address to how key informants in the 





The conceptual framework to be tested in the study 
is depicted in Figure 3.1. The general description of 
the model is given through an elaboration of the 
dependent, explanatory and moderating variables in the 
following sections. 
Dependent Variable 
Relational performance is taken as the dependent 
variable, which is the perceived results of the exchange 
party's performance leading to the other party's 
performance. In industrial purchasing, the dimensions 
of performance are complex and encompass a broad 
spectrum of activities and characteristics such as cost 
rationalisation, quality and lead time improvement. 
Constructs in relational performance in the study can be 
firstly defined through review of literature in 
organisational performance, marketing channels, and 
extended to an inter-organi sational setting from the 
perspective of purchasing management. The theoretical 
models of organisational effectiveness developed by 
Quinn and Rohrbaugh (1983) serve as a basis in defining 
relational performance. The models include the rational 
goal model, the human relations model, the internal 
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Figure 3 . 1 
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK FOR THE STUDY OF 
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process model and the open system model in defining the 
efficiency and effectiveness of firms. 
According to the rational goal model, the primary 
objectives of an organisation are to maximise its 
productivity and efficiency through planning and goal 
setting. In marketing channel, distributors will 
consider manufacturer‘s ability to make available brands 
demanded in their markets. In an industrial buying 
organisation, a key measure of productivity is cost 
rationalisation (Farmer and MacMillan 1976, Dobler, Burt 
and Lee 1990)• Ellram (1992) argues that it is 
important for purchasing to be involved in cost saving 
projects. Such projects may be strategic in nature and 
affect purchasing's decision making process and its 
supplier relationship management. Rajagopal and Bernard 
(1993) also posit that cost containment needs a 
strategic approach as it should provide both short-term 
gains and long-term improvements. The relational 
performance in buyer-seller relationship from the 
buyer's view is therefore on the supplier's ability to 
rationalise its total production cost and benefit the 
buyer in terms of lower total acquisition cost (c.f. 
Noordewier, John and Nevin 1990)• 
The internal process model highlights the nature of 
organisation as a complex system of interdependent 
parts. The emphasis is on stability and control through 
the means of information management and communication. 
In a channel setting, and according to Kumar, Stern and 
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Achrol (1992), following the dictates of the internal 
process model lead one channel member to develop 
policies and programs to evoke coordinated action from 
another, towards its desired end. In purchasing, the 
coordination factor is illustrated in supplier's quality 
management (Lascelles and Dale 1989, Frazier, Spekman 
and O'Neal 1988) . In this context, buyers are asked to 
evaluate suppliers' effort to sustain and improve their 
quality in lihe with the quality policy of the buying 
companies. 
The human relations model places emphasis on 
flexibility and internal focus. It argues that 
organisations are effective to the extent they are able 
to develop highly skilled and committed personnel. 
Thus, the human relations model was associated with 
cohesion and morale as means and human resource 
development as an organisational end. In a channel 
context, this has been operational i sed in terms of 
'reseller competence‘ (Kumar, Stern and Achrol 1992), 
i.e. manufacturer should be concerned with the 
competence of its reseller. In industrial purchasing, 
this competence factor can be set as relating to the 
entrepreneurial role of purchasing in being innovative 
in acquiring new product and production technologies 
(Morris and Calantone 1991, Spekman 1988) . In the 
study, the "supplier competence" factor is investigated 
through supplier's resources for innovation that lead to 
buyer‘s product differentiation. 
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The open system model emphasises the 
interdependence between organisation and its environment 
(Scott 1987)• It stresses the objective of growth and 
external support through flexibility and readiness. A 
key feature is the organisation's ability to adapt to 
changing environment. Kumar, Stern and Achrol (1992) 
assess the criteria in the channel dyad to be 
contribution to growth, customer satisfaction and 
reseller adaptation. In organisational purchasing, the 
relevant scenario is on speed and responsiveness to 
changing needs. (Burt 1989, Frazier, Spekman and O'Neal 
1988, Handfield 1993, Perry 1990). In the study, the 
key question is on suppliers' planning and delivery that 
affect buyers‘ response to changing customers‘ needs. 
A summary of the dependent variables and supporting 
literature is given in Table 3.1. It should be noted 
that the organisational performance models of Quinn and 
Rohrbaugh (1983) cover a wide scope and can be adopted 
as an analogy to sustainable competitive performance 
(c.f. Venkatraman and Ramanujam 1986) . The relational 
competitive performance aspects in cost, quality, 
differentiation and responsiveness have also been widely 
supported in purchasing management literature (Landeros 
and Monczka 1989). 
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Table 3 . 1 
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK AND OPERATIONAL!SED VARIABLES FOR ASSESSING 
RELATIONAL PERFORMANCE FROM THE BUYER'S PERSPECTIVES 
Effectiveness Buyer‘s Supplier's Literature 
mode Objective Contribution Support 
(Quinn and 
Rohrbaugh 1983) 
Rational Productivity Cost Ellram (1992) 
goal and rationalisation 






Internal Stability Quality policy Frazier, 
process and control and programs Spekman, and 
model in line with O'Neal (1988) 
those of the 




Human Human Suppliers‘ Spekman (1988) 
relations resource competence 
model development in innovation Morris and 
leading to Calantone (1991) 
buyers‘ product 
differentiation 
Open Growth and Suppliers' Burt (1989) 
system external speed and model support responsiveness Frazier 
to adapt to Spekman and 





In the study, inter-firm relational!sm in a buyer-
seller context is examined as explanatory variables. 
Relational governance structure consisting of norms 
define the inter-firm linkages that dampen the effect of 
environmental uncertainty. Buyer-seller relationship 
has been one of the contractual in nature. However, the 
use of legal contract alone for completely governing 
exchange is bounded. This stems from its limited 
capacity to focus all possible contingencies impacting 
future exchange relationship (Macneil 1980)• The time 
lapse between agreement and commitment thus accounts for 
the contingencies. We assume in the study an evolution 
process from cost-oriented governance to norms-driven 
behaviour which is enhanced through perceived relational 
performance of the exchange parties. A cross-sectional 
study of relational norms and performance is adopted. 
Five such norms, encompassing the underlying structure 
of relational governance that substitute authority 
governance have been conceptualised in various 
literature (Boyle, Dwyer, Robicheaux and Simpson 1991, 
Macneil 1980, Kaufmann and Dant 1992, Pilling and Zhang 
1992, Landeros and Monczka 1989, Kaufmann and Stern 
1988, Heide and John 1992, Noordewier, John and Nevin 
1990)• These norms are defined and operational!sed in a 
buyer-seller context, as follows: 
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(1) Solidarity 
We define solidarity as the extent to which unity 
arising from common responsibilities and interests 
dominates an exchange relationship. Macneil (1980) 
contends that solidarity is the "common 
conscience", a norm of stability, preservation and 
sometimes sacrifice. In long-term exchange 
relationship, the need for future cooperation 
creates high levels of interdependence in which the 
interests of one party becomes the interests of the 
other party. Continuing relationship is thus 
internalised by the exchange partners as being 
important in and of itself. Pilling and Zhang 
(1992) state this as cooperation which makes 
exchange parties willing to make short-term 
sacrifice to sustain relationship. The 
operationalisation of solidarity therefore 
concentrates on exchange parties' aim to preserve 
good working relationship, to seek unified 
solutions to problems and willingness to make 
sacrifice to keep the relationship intact. 
(2) Mutuality 
Mutuality is here defined as the extent to which 
contractual monitoring of individual transaction is 
tempered by trust and equity in the distribution of 
surpluses and burdens over the course of 
exchanging. In long term exchange behaviour, the 
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flow of benefits, burdens and each party's 
contributions are subject to evolution and 
circumstances, and hence the rules for equitable 
sharing cannot be precisely predetermined. 
Kaufmann and Stern (1988) define the situation as 
that the parties would focus on the benefits 
derived from the ongoing relationship as a whole, 
and the performance of each individual transaction 
is not closely monitored. Pilling and Zhang (1992) 
also refers mutuality as recognising the needs of 
the exchange partner. The operationalisation of 
this construct therefore encompasses the existence 
of mutual trust and fair adjustment over the long 
term (Kaufmann and Dant 1992)• 
(3) Flexibility 
Flexibility is the bilateral expectation that the 
terms of exchange are subject to good faith 
modification and adaptation if environmental 
changes so require. The rationale is that planning 
the terms of future exchanges is necessarily 
incomplete due to bounded rationality, limited 
information, and uncertainty surrounding the future 
state of the environment (Macneil 1980)• Long term 
exchange relationship thus presupposes smooth 
adjustment in exchange policies and practice 
(Boyle, Dwyer, Robicheaux and Simpson 1992, 
LanderOS and Monczka 1988)• The operational!sation 
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would include the degree to which contractual terms 
can be modified to meet changing circumstances or 
when prediction fails. 
(4) Role integrity 
We define role integrity as the extent to which the 
role of both buyers and sellers is seen complex and 
extends beyond the transactions. In relational 
exchange, the maintenance and enhancement of each 
other's role integrity is a vital norm. Macneil 
� 
(1980) contends that the role themselves take an 
intricate inter-linkages between internal rules, 
social customs, and expectations regarding the 
future, and span a range of obligations. A key 
element in the maintenance and enhancement of each 
other's role integrity is the sharing of 
information (Heide and John 1992)• In industrial 
purchasing literature, information sharing has been 
labelled a key relationship measure (Landeros and 
Monczka 1989, Pilling and Zhang 1992, Stuart 1993) 
and includes the types and amount of information 
exchange, as well as willingness to share 
product/market information. The operationalisation 
of the construct therefore includes the degree the 
relationship involves complex responsibilities and 
multiple tasks (Kaufmann and Dant 1992), as well as 
the degree of information sharing. 
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(5) Harmonisation of conflict 
Harmonisation of conflict is the extent to which 
conflict resolution mechanisms incorporate 
situation appraisals to temper contractual conflict 
(Kaufmann and Dant 1992)• Conflict in discrete 
exchange tends to be resolved via external means 
such as litigation. In relational exchange, 
however, there is a presumption that mutual 
sentiments must exist for harmonizing relations in 
order that relationship may endure. The 
operationalisation of this construct is therefore 
on non-negative attitude in conflicts, as well as 
motivation in reviewing history and issues of the 
problems. 
The degree to which the five norms defined above 
are manifested in a relational governance structure. In 
the study, the above set encompassing conceptualisations 
were operationlised using multiple item scales. 
Reflecting their dyadic nature, each construct was 
operational!sed to tap the joint expectations or shared 
values of the exchange parties. In addition, following 
the extant literature, each norm was operational!sed as 
a matter of degree rather than a discrete phenomenon 
(Axelrod 1986, Heide and John 1992). Table 3.2 gives an 
outline descriptions of the operationalised constructs 
for the relational norms used in the study. 
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Table 3 . 2 
OUTLINE DESCRIPTION OF THE 
OPERATIONAL!SED EXPLANATORY VARIABLES USED IN THE STUDY 
Solidarity 
(Macneil 1980, Pilling and Zhang 1992) 
1. Aim at preserving good working relationship. 
2. There exists common interests and responsibilities for both 
parties. 
3. Act together in seeking unified solutions to problems • 
4. Willing to make sacrifice. 
5. Willing to stay together in times of downturn. 
6. Seek courses of actions to benefit own organisation (R) 
Mutuality 
(Kaufmann and Stern 1988, Kaufmann and Dant 1992, Pilling and Zhang 
1992) 
1. Relationship based on mutual trust. 
2. Aim at mutual benefits in the long run. 
3. Negotiation is a dynamic process of adjustment. 
4 . Focus on cost and benefit of on-going relationship. 
5. Make fair adjustment over the longer run. 
6. Relationship does not bring a fair ahare of benefits (R) 
Flexibility 
(Macneil 1980, Boyle, Dwyer, Robicheaux and Siirpson 1992, Landeros 
and Monczka 1988) 
1. Reliance on common honesty and decency in performing the 
contract. 
2. Urgent orders can be committed informally. 
3. Willing to make adjustments in special circumstances. 
4. Cooperate when prediction/forecast fail. 
5. Flexibility in performance of contract is expected. 




Table 3.2 (Cont'd) 
OUTLINE DESCRIPTION OF THE 
OPERATIONALISED EXPLANATORY VARIABLES USED IN THE STUDY 
Role Integrity 
(Kaufmann and Dant 1992, Heide and John 1992, Landeros and Monczka 
1988, Pilling and Zhang 1992, Stuart 1993) 
1. Relationship involves complex responsibilities or tasks• 
2. Give consideration to broader issues during negotiation. 
3. Frequent formal and informal communication between both 
organisations. 
4. Share information about products/markets. 
5. Keep other party informed on changes. 
6. Communication limited to essential details of contract (R) 
Harmonisation of Conflict 
(Kaufmann and Dant 1992) 
1. Non-negative attitude towards conflict. 
2. Render cooperation and openness to seek other‘s views when 
conflict arises. 
3. Effective communication to minimise occurrence of conflict. 
4. Review history of problems 
5. Resolve conflict without resorting to legitation. 




Transorganisational structure variables are treated 
as moderating variables in the study. The effects of 
organisational structure in environment, strategy and 
performance linkages of firms have been well documented 
(Child 1974, Burns and Stalker 1961, White and Hamermesh 
1981, Miles and Snow 1978, Dalton, Todor, Spendolini, 
Fielding and Porter 1980)• Traditional studies of 
organisational structure focused on the "distributional" 
terms of structure in a neo-Weber i an context (see for 
example, Pugh, Hickson, Hinings, and Turner 1968) and do 
not seem to explain the coactivational or network 
structural properties as required by modern 
organisations (Lincoln 1982)• The network properties of 
organisations would better describe the inter-
organisational communication and relationship. 
In general, inter-firm linkages are dictated to 
some extent by the level of involvement of both firms in 
the transactions. A number of dimensions of operating 
structure in strategic marketing alliances has been 
identified by Achrol (1992) , in terms of degree of 
density, differentiation, centralisation and autonomy. 
In theory, it is possible to combine literature on 
structure that specify the configuration of relations 
among organisational members (Tichy and Fombrun 1979, 
Tichy 1980, Ranson, Hinings and Greenwood 1980, Shrader, 
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Lincoln and Hoffman 1989) and extend them to the 
defining variables of inter-organisational structure. 
In this context, the mechanistic-organic 
differentiation as defined by Burns and Stalker (1961) 
serves a useful initial framework for 
transorganisational structural properties. Labelled as a 
mechanistic-organic continuum, inter-firm structure can 
be characterised by highly specific and delimiting job 
descriptors, highly formalised procedures and 
centralisation (mechanistic) to the opposite (organic)• 
Characteristics of the mechanistic-organic continuum can 
be specified by factors of differentiation and 
integration, work focus, task definition, role 
definition, responsibility, structure, locus of 
authority, communication flow, communication context, 
loyalty and prestige (Pearce and David 1983). The 
framework of inter-firm structure proposed by Van de Ven 
and Ferry (1980) has been examined in the literature 
review. The dimensions of formalisation, complexity, 
centralisation and intensity can be adopted in this 
setting. 
A summary of the literature on intra-organisational 
network structure and inter-organisation linkages has 
yielded the following key constructs in inter-




Formalisation is defined as the degree that inter-
organisation linkage is determined by formal rules 
and procedure in the planning and implementation of 
exchange (Pearce and David 1983). High 
formalisation involves clearly defined 
responsibilities, decision-making procedures and 
communication channels. There would also be 
routinely scheduled interactions and well-defined 
procedures for resolving conflicts and measuring 
performance. In classical organisational studies, 
it has been posited that without a minimum level of 
formalisation, role ambiguity may occur (Rizzo, 
House and Lirtzman 1970) and hence will affect 
performance• 
(2) Centralisation 
Centralisation is defined as the degree of 
constriction of authority in the exchange, i.e. 
communication and decisions are made at high levels 
by a small number of organisational members 
(Shrader, Lincoln and Hoffman 1989, McCabe 1987). 
Buyers and sellers may have their transactions 
managed or conducted via top echelon officials from 
both companies. Alternatively, decision making and 
working authority may be decentralised at lower 
levels. In a variety of organisational settings, 
there are evidence to support a conclusion that 
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centralisation is negatively associated with 
performance. Many scholars, however, are 
disinclined to firmly state this conclusion 
(Dalton, Todor, Spendolini, Fielding and Porter 
1980). 
(3) Connectednes s 
Connectedness is defined as the degree of dynamics 
of communication patterns between members in the 
transorganisational activities (Shrader, Lincoln 
and Hoffman 1989, Achrol 1992). The concept of 
connectedness parallels that of a network form of 
communication and is effective in industry of 
technological sophistication (Burns and Stalker 
1961, Hage 1986). The connectedness construct 
comprises notions of density, i.e. number of 
boundary spanning linkages as well as 
differentiation, i.e. diversity of tasks carried 
out at various levels between the two organisations 
(c.f. Van de Ven and Ferry 1980)• 
Table 3.3 gives the key mechanistic/organic 
structural properties relevant to an inter-
organisational setting and Table 3.4 shows the 





KEY MECHANISTIC/ORGANIC STRUCTURAL PROPERTIES 
RELEVANT TO AN INTER-ORGANISATIONAL SETTING 
1. Structure - a network structure of control, authority, 
and communication 
2. Role definition - adjustments made to address the total 
situation of transactions 
3. Task definition - continual redefinition of individual 
tasks through interactions with others. 
4. Locus of authority - ad hoc centre of control authority 
and communication 
5. Communication flow - communication between people of 
different ranks 





OF INTER-ORGANISATIONAL STRUCTURE 
1• Formalisation 
• formal rules and procedure that govern the planning 
and execution of transactions 
• clearly defined contact points between organisations 
for specific issues 
• formal communication channel between the 
o;rganisations 
• routine meeting schedules regarding business 
2. Centralisation 
• Contract negotiation among top management of the 
organisations 
• reference to higher authority for decisions 
• conflict resolution and negotiation rest with senior 
management 
• much more contacts between senior management than 
junior management between the organisations 
3. Connectedness 
• lateral communication between organisations freely 
practised 
• ease to gather intelligence from different 
departments 
• total situation of transactions can be quickly 
assessed 




Purchasing relationship between industrial buyers 
and suppliers of components in manufacturing firms in 
electronics industry in Hong Kong provide the setting 
for this study. These relationships involves purchases 
of critical components that go into the finished goods 
which are considered important by the manufacturers. 
The criticality of the components is defined as the 
significant relationship between purchase cost, quality, 
and/or availability of the components with the selling 
price, quality, and/or market responsiveness of the 
finished goods. Relationships for the transactions of 
critical components are to be the focus of the study as 
relational performance lead to the competitive business 
performance of the firms studied. 
Traditional buyer-seller interactions in 
m a n u f a c t u r i n g firms have been "arm's length" or 
adversarial (Dwyer, Schurr and Oh 1987), when buyers 
often adopt multiple sourcing policy for their supply, 
aiming at price concessions (Porter 1980)• In extreme 
cases, buyers may even design strategies that aim at 
weakening suppliers, with the ultimate objective of 
ensuring their own profits. A modern approach to the 
management of buyer-seller relationship, however, 
emphasises cooperative and win-win relationships in 
industrial markets (Pilling and Zhang 1992, Landeros and 
Monczka 1989). In just-in-time exchange relationship in 
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industrial markets when both manufacturers and suppliers 
aim at elimination of waste, continuous quality 
improvement and minimum total cost of ownership, a 
strong, collaborative inter-firm relationship is needed 
(Frazier, Spekman and O'Neal 1988)• 
Thus buyer-seller relationship can range in a 
spectrum of degree of cooperation specified by 
transactional or relational elements. A key structural 
factor that determine the degree of cooperation is the 
interdependence of firms affected by the number of 
supply sources available. Hence supplies regarded as 
constrained by sole source are to be excluded in the 
study. Also, given that relationship and norms are 
results of an evolution process from one of cost-
orientation to one of norms - orientation, suppliers who 
are new to the buyers will not be considered as valid 
samples for the research (c.f. Ford 1982, Dwyer, Schurr 
and Oh 1987)• In the study, only suppliers relationships 
with more than two years of history are taken into 
account. As a conclusion, samples of supplier 
relationship in the study are controlled on the 
following scales: 
(1) Criticality of the components 
This is expressed in terms of the degree of cost, 
quality, and/or availability of the components that 
affect the competitiveness of the finished 
products. Note that criticality of the components 
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does not automatically guarantee a good supplier 
relationship. 
(2) Number of available sources for the supplies 
Sole source situations are excluded as they might 
mandate structurally dependent relationship between 
buyers and sellers. Note that sole source is not 
the same as single source, which is voluntarily 
adopted by the buying company despite availability 
of multiple supply sources. 
(3) Duration of supplier relationship 
Only relationships of more than two years are 
included in the study. Note that this is in line 
with the underlying assumption that relational 
norms develop over time. 
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Sample and Informants 
Data were collected from informed purchasing 
managers of electronics industry in Hong Kong, which has 
been identified to cover categories of products with 
code 383. List of the companies is as contained in the 
Directory of Hong Kong Industries 1992, published by the 
Hong Kong Productivity Council. The products include 
both electronic components and finished products and are 
indicated in Table 3.5. Full list of the products 
involved is given in Appendix B. A total of 1649 firms 
are contained in the listing which include double counts 
as some firms are producing products in different 
product categories. 
To set the scale of the study to a manageable size, 
a random sample of 50% of the population was targeted 
for the study (825 firms). The first step was to exclude 
those firms which were sourcing for re-distribution (as 
indicated in the Directory) and not for own value-added 
production process, as we wish to study the relationship 
between supplier management and competitiveness of 
product offerings. Duplicates of major firms having two 
or more organisational establishment listings were 
eliminated to avoid a large-firm bias. A further step 
was also taken to exclude those firms which were small-
sized, with less than 20 employees in Hong Kong, as 
indicated in the Directory. 
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Table 3 .5 
CATEGORIES OF PRODUCTS IN THE 
ELECTRONICS INDUSTRY IN HONG KONG 
Product code Products 
3831 Manufacture of electrical industrial 
machinery and apparatus 
3832 Manufacture of transitorised radios 
3833 Manufacture of electrical appliances 
and housewares 
3834 Manufacture of electronic product 
3835 Manufacture of sound producing and 
recording equipment and apparatus 
3836 Manufacture of dry batteries 
3837 Manufacture of torch and electronic 
bulbs and tubes 
3938 Manufacture of computing machinery and 
equipment 
3339 Manufacture of electrical apparatus and 
supplies 
Total marriber of firms : 1649 




The data collection employs a key informant 
methodology and questionnaire. According to Campbell 
(1955), key informants should meet the criteria of being 
knowledgeable regarding the phenomenon under study as 
well as willing and capable to communicate to the 
researcher. The measurement of social relationships in 
an inter-organisational setting, however, has always 
been a nagging and unresolved problem. This is 
compounded by the ambiguity of buying groups structure 
and interaction processes reported in industrial 
marketing literature (Johnston and Bonoma 1981). The 
key informant methodology for the study was therefore 
executed with due care, and included a major step of 
conducting preliminary case studies which helped to 
determine the appropriate process of locating key 
informants for the survey. 
In this regard, eight in-depth case studies were 
conducted to verify the key informant methodology. 
During the interviews, it was found that while key 
personnels of organisations could describe the contents 
and status of their organisational relationship with 
their suppliers, it was also observed that some top 
purchasing personnel were unaware of the extent and 
quality of interactions of their subordinates with the 
supplier organisations. Despite this, it was found that 
electronic firms in Hong Kong normally had separate 
departments responsible for their purchasing activities. 
The department managers were also able to indentify the 
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critical components and the corresponding products 
relevant to the study. It was also reported that 
electronic firms in Hong Kong generally had their 
supplier management tasks mainly undertaken by the 
purchasing departments. During the interviews, 
purchasing managers were also found generally 
knowledgeable, though not in detail, about their 
relationship with suppliers. When they were asked to 
recommend key informants for the relationship status 
with specific suppliers, the recommended informants were 
generally found capable to report details. The 
interviews also confirmed the validity of the controlled 
concepts on criticality of components, number of 
available sources and duration of supplier relationship, 
which met the purpose of the study. 
Prior to the administration of the mail 
questionnaire, we contacted each firm by locating and 
confirming the identity of the purchasing manager/agent 
who has the ability to serve as a key informant. 410 
questionnaires were then mailed to firms, addressing 
directly to the purchasing managers/agents who had been 
identified in the pilot telephone contacts； and for 
those not clearly identified, mails were addressed to 
the General Manager and the letters asked for assistance 
in assigning an appropriate personnel for a response. A 
range of response-building techniques was used. These 
included firstly a clear statement of the purpose of the 
research, a promise of confidentiality and allowing for 
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anonymity of suppliers ‘ names, as well as an offer to 
share the research findings. A telephone follow-up was 
made two weeks after the mailing of the questionnaire 
and a reminder was sent to non-respondents four weeks 
after the first mailing. A further step towards 
minimising informant bias was inclusion of a post hoc 
self-reports on the informants‘ knowledge of and 
involvement in the buyers ‘ relationships with the 
suppliers. Table 3.6 summarises an account of the key 
informant method and response-building measure. 
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Table 3 . 6 
SUMMARY OF KEY INFORMANT METHOD 
AND RESPONSE-BUILDING MEASURES 
1. Atten^ts to verify key informant method 
(a) To acquire general knowledge about purchasing 
management organisations and their tasks through 
contacts with managers in the electronics industry. 
(b) To conduct in-depth case studies in eight firms in 
order to locate the most qualified informant for 
specific supplier relationship status. General 
manager/purchasing managers were also asked to refer 
cases to the best informed person for the survey, who 
were subsequently confirmed to have the adequate 
knowledge about their con5>anies‘ relationship with 
specific suppliers. 
(c) Interviews were conducted to confirm the controlled 
concepts on criticality of components, supplier source 
availablity and duration of relationship. 
(d) Include the use of a post hoc analysis of respondents‘ 
qualification• 
2. Attenpts to iniprove response to the survey 
(a) Motivate informants to cooperate in the study seriously 
by giving them a detail purpose of the study and 
offering them a summary of results on completion of 
project. 
(b) Use pretested and concise questions in the survey which 
help to avoid the iinpact of alternate framing of 
questions. 
(c) Informants requested to provide perceptual data only. 
There is a promise of confidentiality and allowance for 
anonymity of suppliers^ names. 
(d) Systematic method and schedule to follow up non-




The study of inter-organisational strategic 
networking or cooperative relationship have emphasised 
the degree of interdependence between parties, for 
example, in sharing assets (Pfeffer and Salancik 1978, 
Rogers and Whetten 1982)• Stemming from structure-
oriented approach, action-based research addresses the 
influence strategy of firms in enhancing cooperation and 
the subsequent performance (Hallen, Johanson and Seyed-
Mohamed 1991). Interaction theorists, in contrast, have 
often suggested that development of cooperative norms 
spring from continuous transactions over time. A 
transaction is therefore a momentary episode in a 
continuous social relation (c.f. Hakansson 1982). 
Exchange parties thus come to cooperate out of altruism 
rather than because of exogenous requirements (Macneil 
1980). 
The study takes on the relations-oriented approach 
and suggests a cross-sectional examination of the 
relationship between the degree of relational governance 
structure with perceived relational performance outcomes 
which would eventually lead to competitive business 
performance for the buying firms. In the context of the 
conceptual framework of the study, and with the 
relational governance structure defined in a discrete-
relational continuum, the perceived relational 
performance as the dependent variable is hypothesised to 
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be moderated by the inter-organisational structure. The 
inter-organisational structure as the moderating 
variable is to ascertain that organisations exist in a 
field of other organisations also attend a degree of 
structure. The overall hypothesis of the study is 
therefore as follows : relational performance in a 
buyer-seller relationship is influenced by the degree of 
inter-firm relationalism expressed in terms of 
solidarity, mutuality, flexibility, role integrity and 
harmonisation of conflict. The process is moderated by 
the inter-organisational structure defined in 
mechanistic/organic mode and expressed in terms of 
formalisation, centralisation and connectedness. 
Hypotheses stemming from this overall hypothesis 
are formulated based on literature and company cases 
under the following headings of relational performance. 
Five of such representative company cases are given in 
Appendix C. 
Relational goal model — cost 
Given that minimisation of total acquisition cost 
is the rational goal of a buyer, relational performance 
from the buyer's perspective is supplier's cost 
contribution. In this context, norms of solidarity, 
flexibility and harmonisation of conflict will 
contribute to this rational goal more in centralised 
inter-firm structure. The rationale is that 
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centralisation depicts direct involvement from top 
management and/or defined locus of purchasing and 
marketing authorities. McCabe (1987) has hypothesised 
that high level of uncertainty lead to constriction of 
decision-making authority. In electronics industry 
which entails fast-moving and uncertain environment, 
cost relationalisation of critical components is 
normally handled by senior management. Hence, in the 
setting of critical components in the study, sense of 
unity (solidarity), mutual aim (mutuality), and non-
negative attitude towards conflict (harmonisation of 
conflict) are important in the trade-off analyses 
between cost and, for example, quantity of purchase 
(Ellram 1992) and in value engineering projects; while 
flexibility in delivery (flexibility) and information 
sharing (role integrity) often help both parties to 
better plan their production and inventories in the 
elimination of waste (c.f. Frazier, Spekman and O'Neal 
1988) • The hypotheses regarding relational performance 
within the rational goal model are therefore: 
Hia The relationship between solidarity and relational 
performance of cost in a buyer-seller setting is 




Hib The relationship between mutuality and relational 
performance of cost in a buyer-seller setting is 
stronger in a centralised structure than a 
decentralised structure 
Hic The relationship between flexibility and relational 
performance of cost in a buyer-seller setting is 
stronger in a centralised structure than a 
decentralised structure 
Hid The relationship between role integrity and 
relational performance of cost in a buyer-seller 
setting is stronger in a centralised structure than 
a decentralised structure 
Hie The relationship between harmonisation of conflict 
and relational performance of cost in a buyer-
seller setting is stronger in a centralised 
structure than a decentralised structure 
Following the definition of formalisation and 
connectedness in an inter-firm setting, there is no 
literature nor consistent empirical support to their 
intervention on the association of relational norms and 
cost performance. Walsh and Dewar (1987)' for example, 
suggest that formalisation can be best understood in the 
context of organisational cycle. Formalisation as 
efficiency is likely to contribute to effectiveness 
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early in organisational relationship. Ellram (1992) 
contend that contracts are either unnecessary, or of 
limited importance in the success of international 
purchasing alliances. Hence no hypothesis is set with 
respect to formalisation and connectedness towards the 
rational good model. 
Internal process model - quality 
Quality is a related concept to cost. Despite the 
concept of "quality is free" (Crosby 1979), quality is 
important, but only to the extent that it serves a 
function. In many instances, quality conformance at 
lower cost is often cited a quality improvement policy 
of many firms. See, for example, cases of Honda and 
Xerox reported by Bertrand (1986) . In this setting, 
similar hypotheses are set as in the case for rational 
goal for cost rationalisation. 
H2a The relationship between solidarity and relational 
performance of quality in a buyer-seller setting is 
stronger in a centralised structure than a 
decentralised structure. 
H2b The relationship between mutuality and relational 
performance of quality in a buyer-seller setting is 




H2C The relationship between flexibility and relational 
performance of quality in a buyer-seller setting is 
stronger in a centralised structure than a 
decentralised structure. 
H2d The relationship between role integrity and 
relational performance of quality in a buyer-seller 
setting is stronger in a centralised structure than 
a decentralised structure. 
H2e The relationship between harmonisation of conflict 
and relational performance of quality in a buyer-
seller setting is stronger in a centralised 
structure than a decentralised structure. 
Human relations model - innovation 
The relational performance of innovation is here 
defined in terms of supplier's resource of innovation 
that contribute to buyer‘s product differentiation. The 
technology issue may include joint design programs which 
often require common interest and responsibility 
(solidarity), sharing of market/product information 
(role integrity) and handling conflict regarding 
specification in the design process (harmonisation of 
conflict) (Imrie and Morris 1992)• Their effect on the 
c o m m e r c i a l i s a t i o n of technology is often moderated by an 
organic inter-firm structure (connectedness)• Burns and 
‘ f 
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stalker (1961) have argued that organic structures, 
characterised by such things as flexibility in 
administrative relations, informality, and authority 
vested in situational expertise, facilitate innovation. 
It can be argued that organic structure enable 
entrepreneurial endeavours because such structures 
enable decision makers aware of the need for change and 
provide the resource and collaborative framework 
necessary for it. Hence we formulate the following 
hypotheses: 
H33 The relationship between solidarity and relational 
performance of innovation in a buyer-seller setting 
is stronger in a connected structure than in a less 
connected structure. 
H3b The relationship between mutuality and relational 
performance of innovation in a buyer-seller setting 
is stronger in a connected structure than in a less 
connected structure. 
H3C The relationship between flexibility and relational 
performance of innovation in a buyer-seller setting 




H3d The relationship between role integrity and 
relational performance of innovation in a buyer-
seller setting is stronger in a connected structure 
than in a less connected structure. 
H3Q The relationship between harmonisation of conflict 
and relational performance of innovation in a 
buyer-seller setting is stronger in a connected 
structure than in a less connected structure. 
Open system model — responsiveness 
Suppliers' adaptability to buyers‘ changing 
requirement has long been proclaimed a distinctive 
competitive advantage to the buying firm (Burt 1989, 
Handfield 1993). This performance criterion often arise 
in partnership type of sourcing embedded in strong ties 
of unity (solidarity), adaptive behaviour (flexibility) 
(Hallen, Johanson and Seyed-Mohamed 1991), frequent 
information sharing (role integrity) (Pilling and Zhang 
1992) and effective communication (harmonisation of 
conflict) (Bertrand 1986)• Thus buyers and sellers in 
strategic partnerships utilise joint problem-solving 
efforts to develop mutual responses to change in the 
marketplace. Responsivenss is an important feature of 
just-in-time exchange relationship (O'Neal 1978). 
Formalisation is thus a deterring factor to this 
relationship based on the axiomatic theory of Hage 
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(1965) • We therefore purpose the following hypotheses: 
H4a The relationship between solidarity and relational 
performance of responsiveness in a buyer-seller 
setting is weaker in a formalised structure than in 
a less formalised structure. 
H4b The relationship between mutuality and relational 
performance of responsiveness in a buyer-seller 
setting is weaker in a formalised structure than in 
a less formalised structure. 
H4C The relationship between flexibility and relational 
performance of responsiveness in a buyer-seller 
setting is weaker in a formalised structure than in 
a less formalised structure. 
H4d The relationship between role integrity and 
relational performance of responsiveness in a 
buyer-seller setting is weaker in a formalised 
structure than in a less formalised structure. 
H4e The r e l a t i o n s h i p between harmonisation of conflict 
and relational performance of responsiveness in a 
buyer-seller setting is weaker in a formalised 
structure than in a less formalised structure. 
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Responsiveness can also be expressed as a result of 
norms intervened by different degree of connectedness 
structure (Weick 1979, Orton and Weick 1990)• The 
hypotheses are: 
H5a. The relationship between solidarity and relational 
performance of responsiveness in a buyer-seller 
setting is stronger in a connected structure than 
in a less connected structure. 
H5b The relationship between mutuality and relational 
performance of responsiveness in a buyer-seller 
setting is stronger in a connected structure than 
in a less connected structure. 
H5C The r e l a t i o n s h i p between flexibility and relational 
performance of responsiveness in a buyer-seller 
setting is stronger in a connected structure than 
in a less connected structure. 
H5d The r e l a t i o n s h i p between role integrity and 
relational performance of responsiveness in a 
buyer-seller setting is stronger in a connected 
structure than in a less connected structure. 
I 
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H5e The relationship between harmonisation of conflict 
and relational performance of responsiveness in a 
buyer-seller setting is stronger in a connected 
structure than in a less connected structure. 


































































































































































































































The theoretical construct in the study were 
measured using multi-item scales. Measures were 
developed using conventional psychometrie scale 
development procedure: from specification of domain of 
construct to development of norms (Churchill 1979, 
Nunnally 1978) . Items are firstly generated based on 
relevant literature and then modified to fit the context 
of the study. In this respect, our industry - specific 
knowledge gained through field study interviews proved 
to be invaluable in developing meaningful measures in 
the study. Multiple items were generated to be content 
valid with reference to the definitions which underwent 
the following process of refinement: 
(1) Development of content-valid constructs 
Items generated for each construct were initially 
tested among a group of 65 final-year students 
enrolled on a 3-year part- t i m e - e v e n i n g Diploma 
course in Purchasing and Supply of the Hong Kong 
Polytechnic. The students were all having full-
t i m e -employment in the purchasing and supply field 
in different industries and have an average of 7 
years of e x p e r i e n c e in the field. Feedback was 
solicited with respect to the relevance of the 
context of the questions and suggestions or 
I 
118 
additional and alternative statements were also 
invited. 
(2) Initial design of questionnaire 
An in-depth discussion with a group of 8 purchasing 
managers from the electronics industry was then 
held. The discussion rated the relevance of each 
of the questions generated in the first stage of 
the refinement. Each question is thoroughly 
discussed with respect to the relevance of its 
context that match the theoretical content. 
Ambiguous and irrelevant statements were discarded, 
leaving about 7 items for each construct in the 
explanatory and moderating variables. 
(3) Pre-test of questionnaire 
A pilot test was performed among a group of 37 
purchasing management personnel who are members of 
the Hong Kong Procurement Professional Association 
(HKPPA) . The test was performed during a Seminar 
organised for the HKPPA and nearly all participants 
are purchasing executives and managers from the 
electronics industry. The pilot test included 
receiving of comments from participants on the 
conceptual framework, relevance of each construct 
and context of individual items for the constructs. 
Coefficient alpha is calculated for each statement 
and those with relatively lower item-total 
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correlation are discarded. The number of questions 
was reduced to about six for each construct. 
Appendix D gives the questionnaire used in the 
study. All constructs were measured on an 8-item scale. 
The scale has been proved to be more appropriate based 
on results of a pilot test which gives ideas about the 
distribution of data. Analyses of the data collected are 





Data acquired from 142 usable questionnaires are 
analysed for the testing of the conceptual framework for 
the study. Table 4.1 gives a profile of the respondents. 
Note that with respect to the key informant methodology, 
deletion of returned questionnaires is mainly due to low 
post hoc scores. The score of the usable returned 
questionnaires is 4.08 which is considered satisfactory. 
The process of data analysis includes purifying the 
measures and assessing their reliability and validity 
before the resultant data are further processed for the 
study of their associative relationships. Multiple 
regressions using the factor scores are the key 
analytical tool (Draper and Smith 1980) , with the Chow 
test (Chow 1960) being the method to assess the effect 
of the moderating variables on the regressions. The 
following sections give a complete account of the data 
analysis procedure and results. 
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Table 4 . 1 
PROFILE OF RESPONDENTS OF THE SURVEY 
Item Number Percentage 
Location of the Local 105 74% 
supplier Overseas 37 26% 
Number of suppliers One 48 34% 
for the cort5>onent Two 82 58% 
More than two 12 8% 
Years of business 2-4 years 97 68% 
experience with the 5-7 years 41 29% 
supplier 8-10 years 4 3% 
Number of returned questionnaires : 158 
Number of usable questionnaires : 142 
Scale of post hoc analysis of respondents' qualification based on 




Each variable that was measured with multiple items 
was subject to a purification procedure. In the study, 
the theoretical constructs of relational performance 
were measured on single-item scales because the 
opera ti onali s ed items were widely accepted in 
literature. For the multi-item explanatory and 
moderating variables, a reliability analysis was 
performed for each of the measures. Items with weak 
inter-correlations were deleted. This was done by 
computing the Cronbach‘s coefficient alpha values 
according to the underlying rationale for a domain 
sampling model (Nunnally 1978), which holds that the 
purpose for any measurement is to estimate the score 
that would be obtained if all the items in the 
constructs domain were included. Hence those items 
with low item-to-total-scale correlations were deleted 
to reduce error, as it indicated that they were not 
drawn from the same domain. This process suggested 
reduction of items. The Cronbach‘s alpha ranged from 
0.62 to 0.88 for the explanatory variables and from 0.56 
to 0.83 for the moderating variables. 
Since we argued that the different domains of 
r e l a t i o n s h i p and structure were theoretically distinct, 
it was important to test whether the measure were also 
distinct. In this connection, convergent and 
d i s c r i m i n a n t validity of the constructs measured were 
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assessed by simple correlation analysis and by common 
factor analysis. The method was to take multiple-item 
measurement as a substitute for multiple methods. 
Items measuring a specific construct should show 
high inter-correlations among themselves and low inter-
correlations with items measuring other constructs. 
Common factor analysis was used to show whether items 
measuring a single construct were loaded on the same 
factor, as an indicator of convergent validity. When 
items measuring different constructs are loaded on 
different factors, and no one item load on several 
factors, discriminant validity is said to exist. 
The result of the common factor analysis with 
varimax rotations is shown in the following Table 4.2, 
with only factor scores above 0.4 are presented. Four 
factors having eigenvalues greater than 1 emerged from 
the factor analysis. 
It can be observed the four constructs of 
Solidarity, Flexibility, Role Integrity and 
H a r m o n i s a t i o n of Conflict fall onto distinctive factors 
while Mutuality does not. The explanation can be that 
mutuality as the extent of sharing surpluses and burdens 
over the course of exchange has overlapped with the 
solidarity and information sharing/role integrity 
concepts (Heide and John 1990). Ellram (1990), for 
example, equates mutual trust with the information 




FACTOR ANALYSIS WITH VARIMAX ROTATIONS ON INITIAL FACTORS 
FACTOR 1 FACTOR 2 FACTOR 3 FACTOR 4 FACTOR 5 
SOLIDS .77135 
SOLID4 .75533 
SOLID2 .61618 .47768 
MUTUAL5 .59729 .56143 
SOLIDS .58402 
MUTUAL2 .54307 .40597 .47027 
MUTUALl .51656 .43191 
HARH0N4 .70627 
HARMONI .70512 
HABMON3 .42860 .67612 
HARMON2 .62652 
INTEG4 .61118 .57215 
INTEG5 .59289 -52744 
FLEX5 -46805 .40365 
INTEGl .86879 
INTEG2 .67260 .44544 
INTEG3 -65031 
SOLIDl -46777 .53540 
MUTUAL3 .42396 .51253 
„ .73896 FLEX2 
.71563 FIIEX4 
.60349 FLEXl 
.60114 .40803 FLEX3 




with mutuality and include willingness to make short-
term sacrifices to sustain relationship as a measure, 
which in fact is solidarity in our study. It was 
decided that no changes in the names of original 
constructs should be needed. The same procedure was 
applied in purifying the items for transorganisational 
structure which acts as moderating variables. 
The first step in assessing consistency and 
unidimens i onal i ty of constructs has yielded the 
following number of items for the explanatory and 
moderating variables : 
(1) Explanatory Variables 
Solidarity 3 items 
Flexibility 4 items 
Role Integrity 3 items 
Harmonisation 4 items 
of Conflicts 
(2) Moderating Variables 
Formalisation 3 items 
Centralisation 3 items 
Connectedness 3 items 
I 
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Internal consistency of remaining items was checked 
again for their Cronbach * s alpha values, and their 
validity on common factor analysis. The alpha values 
ranged from 0.63 to 0.88 and the constructs showed 
evidence of both convergent and discriminant validity, 
as indicated in Table 4.3. Table 4.4 gives the 
reliability of the final set of explanatory and 
moderating variables. 
Only the HARMON 3 (effective communication to 
minimise conflict) and INTEG 2 (broader issues 
considered in negotiation) have shown deviations by 
loadings on two factors. As the factor scores are 
relatively lower (0.40 and 0.48 respectively) and 
compared to the main factors (0.68 and 0.71 
respectively) , no further item deletion was recommended. 
The purification process for the constructs so far has 
confirmed both the consistency and validity of 
constructs, giving rise of unidimensionality for each 
construct and making them ready for a correlation 
testing procedure. 
Ideally, m e a s u r e m e n t development should be based on 
a separate sample and the validity should be checked on 
individual sample. However, given the limitations on 
sample development, the method adopted can be treated as 
a second-best one. Furthermore, the measurement 





FACTOR LOADINGS OF FINAL SET OF EXPLANATORY VARIABLES 













INTEG2 .48428 .70680 




RELIABILITY OF FINAL SET OF EXPLANATORY 
AND MODERATING VARIABLES 
SCALE NO. OF VALID CRONBACH‘ S MEAN S.D 
ITEMS CASES ALPHA 
FLEXIBILITY 4 141 .838 23.43 4.44 
HABMONISATION 4 142 .837 23.08 3.89 
SOLIDARITY 3 141 .767 17.04 3.38 
INTEGRITY 3 142 .817 17.20 3.58 
FORMALISATION 3 142 .886 9.30 3.44 
CENTRALISATION 3 142 .629 8.92 3.26 
CONNECTEDNESS 3 141 .633 16.48 2.97 
I 
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The finalised items for the dependent, explanatory 
and moderating variables were then used for testing the 
hypotheses of the study, which explained the 
relationship between transactional norms and relational 




Testing of Hypotheses 
The factors analysis procedure served as a preliminary 
data reduction and formed part of a larger analysis. 
The factors selected explained the i n t e r - r e l a t i o n s h i p 
among the original variables. The factor scores were 
used as independent variables as they exhibited 
uniqueness in their dimensionality. Standard checkings 
on the assumptions of multiple regressions were 
performed with respect to collinearity diagnostics, 
casewise plot of residual and standardised scatterplot. 
The conceptual framework of the study demands an 
associative relationship between norms-driven governance 
structure of exchange and perceived competitive 
performance. Multiple regressions using factors scores 
of the explanatory variables were used to detect their 
contribution to the dependable variables. The relative 
importance of the individual inter-firm variables was 
investigated by estimating the following regressions 
model: 
P i = b i i F L E X l + bi2 HARMO + b i s SOLID + bi4 I N T E G 
P2 = b 2 l F L E X l + b22 HARMO + b 2 3 SOLID + b24 ^ T E G 
P3 = b 3 i F L E X l + b32 HARMO + h s s SOLID + 634 INTEG 
P4 = b 4 i F L E X l + b42 HARMO + SOLID + h^^ I N T E G 
^here Pi, P2, refer to performance indicators of 
cost, quality, innovation, and responsiveness 
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respectively, and FLEXl is flexibility, HARMO 
harmonisation of conflict, SOLID solidarity and INTEG 
role integrity/information sharing. 
As the factor scores so determined after confirming 
unidimensionality of construct (hence both convergent 
and discriminant validity) were uniquely defined, the 
data set was free from multi col linearity and correlation 
of residuals. The moderating effect to the multiple 
regressions employed a subgroups analysis (c.f. Arnold 
1982) . Specifically, the regression analysis was 
repeatedly performed in subgroups reflecting high and 
low scores of the moderating variables. Consistent with 
standard econometric convention, the middle 20% of the 
cases were omitted to improve the contrast between the 
subgroups and hence the power of subsequent statistical 
tests (see for example, Johnston 1972) . Performance 
indicators were then regressed as the dependent 
variables on transactional norms on all cases in the two 
subgroups. Next, a second regression was performed to 
allow the regression coefficient estimates to take a 
different values across the two subgroups. The sum of 
squared residuals was then used for the Chow test (Chow 
I960) to assess the statistical significance of the 
differences in the regression coefficients. The test 
aimed to confirm whether the two sets of observations 
belong to the same regression model. 
The hypothesised significance of the three 
moderating variables from transorganisational structure 
I 
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was then analysed in similar logic. Summary of the Chow 
tests for an overall testing of the conceptual framework 
and the corresponding hypotheses are given in Tables 
























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Interpretation of Findings 
The data analyses generally confirm the conceptual 
framework and hypotheses of the study, with a few 
deviations from some of the priori hypothesised 
relationships. Relational performance for 
competitiveness, drawn form rational goal model, 
internal process model, human relations model and open 
system model (Quinn and Rohrbaugh 1983) , and 
operationalised as cost rationalisation, quality 
improvement, innovativeness, and responsiveness are 
found explained by relational norms of solidarity, 
flexibility, role integrity/information sharing and 
harmonisation of conflict. The casual relationship is 
moderated by inter-organisational structure. The 
overall regression has R2 ' s ranging from 0.362 to 0.574 
and are considered to have adequate explanatory power. 
The findings summarised in Tables 4.5, 4.6 and 4.7 
are interpreted in the following sections. 
Cost and Centralisation 
Centralisation refers to the constriction at the top for 
operations and decision making in the inter-
organisational setting. McCabe (1987) suggests that 
high levels of uncertainty lead to a constriction of 
decision-making authority in industrial purchasing and 
I 
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marketing. Cost rationalisation as a relational 
performance, however, often takes a multi-facet approach 
requiring joint value engineering/analysis efforts, 
negotiation, matching of buyer's economic order quantity 
and supplier's economic batch quality and/or 
rationalisation of inventory through better planning 
from both sides. Recall that continuous cost 
improvement is a dominant feature in fast moving 
industry such as the electronics industry, performance 
of purchasing is often assessed in terms of its cost 
rationalisation efforts and demand attention from top 
management in their execution. The hypotheses that 
centralisation positively moderate the effect the 
rational norms have on cost performance are supported 
through the Chow test (F=2.39b): solidarity (0.413^ High 
-0.330^ Low), flexibility (0.338丑 High - insignificant 
Low) as well as harmonisation of conflict (0.663^ High -
0.401^ Low) support Hia, Hic, ^le- Role integrity Hid 
shows a reverse direction, though not significant 
(0.317b High - 0.369丑 Low) and cannot be adequately 
explained through literature. An empirical case may be 
that in the purchase of high-end components, suppliers 
normally have more dominating power in setting selling 
price which is barely affected by the information 
sharing aspects of buyer-seller relationship. 
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Quality and Centralisation 
Quality and cost are parallel concepts most of the 
time and thus bear similar hypotheses as in the 
relationship between cost and centralisation. With the 
Chow Statistic F=2‘65, all the hypotheses H2a, 
H2e are supported in this setting, and with an 
especially stronger moderating effect on flexibility 
、；/. 
(0.483a High 一 insignificant Low) and role integrity 
(0.474a High - insignificant Low). In centralised inter-
firm structure, norms of making adjustments to, for 
example specification requirements and sharing 
information about product/market and substitutes will 
attract supplier's quality performance towards buyer‘s 
goals and policies. For important-component and 
important-product settings, quality generally invites 
participation from top management. An alternative view, 
however, might be that quality has became more a 
decentralised function, for example in efforts towards 
International Standards Organisation (ISO) 
certification. Interpretation of this finding must also 
consider the fact that there is no conclusion from 
organisational theorists as to the function or 
dysfunction of centralisation on performance (Dalton, 
Todar, Spendolini, Fielding and Porter 1980)• Despite 
this, the test generally support the effect of supplier 
relationship in buyer‘s quality management function in 
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purchasing literature (Ellram 1990, Stuart 1993, 
Landeros and Monczka 1989)• 
Innovation and Connectedness 
Connected inter-firm structure in terms of organic 
relationships has been hypothesised to moderate the 
effect of solidarity, mutuality, role integrity and 
harmonisation of conflict on innovative performance of 
suppliers to buyer‘s goal H3b, ^Se) • 
Support for the hypotheses is divided, though the Chow 
statistic is significant at 3.53. While solidarity 
(H3a) A and harmonisation of conflict 叱 ^ ) do stand, 
Flexibility 叱 ^ ) and Role Integrity {E^ d) are found to 
be in opposite direction. It might be that the key 
ingradient of role integrity or effective communication 
do not cover the innovative aspects and do not concern 
the connectedness of the structure, particularly for 
high-end components. On the one hand, suppliers‘ 
development effort that may lead to buyers ‘ product 
differentiation may take place in a centralised 
organisational setting. On the other, suppliers' and 
buyers' technology might be disparately different. 
Despite this, the relatively strong discrimination of 
(insignificant High - 0.263^ Low) cannot be fully 
explained at this stage. The same explanation can be 
given to Flexbility i^Sc) • It may also be a case that 
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connectedness is a rich concept not fully captured in 
its opera t i o n a l i s a t i o n . The test, however, generally 
confirms the shared norms of unity and positive attitude 
to conflicts will lead to innovative performance in 
close buyer - s e l l e r relationship (Frazier, Spekman and 
O'Neal 1988, Morris and Calantone 1991)• 
Responsiveness and Formalisation 
The hypotheses H4a, H-c, ^^d, are all supported in 
the analysis. Formalisation refer to the use of formal 
rules and procedure in the exchange relationship and is 
a clearly defined concept. Formalisation is especially 
important when interdependence between organisations is 
high and the exchange is complex and long-term (c.f. 
Dwyer, Schurr and Oh 1987) • However, high degree of 
formalisation often hamper the potential benefits 
derived from cooperative buyer-seller relationship, 
particularly in just-in-time environment when innovation 
and responsiveness are key features to sustain on-going 
relationship (Frazier, Spekman and O'Neale 1988)• 
Responsiveness and Connectedness 
None of the hypotheses of Hs^^ HSc, were 
supported in the findings. Despite anecdotal evidence 
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that more interconnected structure would facilitate 
relational norms for adaptation and responsiveness, the 
research does not suggest any confirmed arguments. 
Similar to previous explanation, it is suspected that 
the connectedness of inter-firm structure is too rich a 
concept (Lincoln 1982, Burns and Stalker 1961) and has 
not be captured adequately in the research. Indeed, 
organic inter-firm structure covers a wide span of 
factors regarding differentiation, communication flow, 
role definition and task adjustments (Pearce and David 
1993) • As such, there are overlapping concepts with the 
relational structure. Future work should be directed in 
this respect to uncover the network/organic nature of 
inter-firm structure as against the distributional form 
on formalisation and centralisation. 
Overall, the findings have supported most of the 
hypotheses, as summarised in Table 4.8. The conclusion 
derived from the interpretation of findings with 
reference to the conceptual frame is given in the next 







































































































































































































































































































































































Exchange relationships between organisations are 
becoming a salient topic in research concerning 
organisational theory (Powell 1990), marketing channels 
(Reve and Stern 1979), organisational purchasing (Ellram 
1992) and international business strategy (Toyne 1989, 
Ghoshal and Bartlett 1990) • With a primary base in 
resource-dependence theory, an organisation is entering 
into a network of exchange relationships with other 
organisations in achieving and sustaining its 
competitive position in industry. An exchange 
relationship involves development of a governance 
structure that facilitates the transfer of resources or 
services between organisations. In exploring such 
relationships, researchers have focused on determinants 
of their formation (Van de Ven 1976, Borys and Jemison 
1989), and to a greater extent, on power-dependence 
aspects of relationship (Pfeffer and Salancik 1978, Van 
de Ven and Walker 1984) . Furthermore, transaction cost 
approach has been extensively utilised in the study of 
inter-firm alliances. For example, Klein, Frazier and 
Roth (1990) develop a transaction cost analysis model 
designed to explain the channel integration choice of 
firms in international markets. Myer (1984) reports 
that just-in-time suppliers respond to buyers‘ demand in 
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cost conscious ways. Heide and John (1990) develop a 
theoretical model of industrial buyer-seller ties in 
which transaction costs are primary motive for joint 
action. Little effort, however, has been put in 
studying the association between transactional norms and 
relational performance. Disciplined inter一organisational 
studies in the buyer-seller context are also extremely 
limited in purchasing literature (Naumann and Kim 1986)• 
Inter - firm issues need to be examined in the 
context of a socio-political paradigm. The theoretical 
frame of the study lies on the emergence of a norms-
driven governance mechanism as explained by social 
exchange theory. Indeed, markets have been described as 
organised behavioral systems (Alderson 1965). In 
industrial markets, buyer-seller relationships are 
generally long term and stable (Hakansson 1982). 
Anecdotal evidence and some empirical investigation work 
have confirmed the strategic importance of supplier 
relationship in bringing competitiveness for the buying 
firm. The relationship between transactional norms and 
perceived relational performance is especially important 
a subject to investigate. The study in the electronics 
industry in Hong Kong here offers an effect in this 
direction. With hightened level of global competition, 
companies are forced to re-appraise the interlocked 
system of quality and business-to-business transactions. 
Also, against the backdrop of changing patterns of 
competitiveness in the manufacturing industry in Hong 
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Kong, and electronics industry in particular, this 
research contribute to our knowledge in both theoretical 
and practical management aspects as elaborated in the 
sections below. 
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Contribution of the Study 
The contribution of the study can be related to 
both conceptual and empirical aspects. On the 
conceptual side, the study introduces the moderating 
effect of inter - o r g a n i s a t i o n a l structure that influences 
the process of exchange, whereas classical studies are 
largely centered on the relationship between the 
structure and performance in an intra - o r g a n i s a t i o n a l 
context. The empirical findings of the study provide 
encouraging support to the conceptual framework 
established through literature. 
In suinmary, formalisation of inter-firm structure 
is found to moderate the relationship between relational 
norms and perceived effectiveness of buyer-seller 
relationship. Degree of centralisation between firms is 
an important consideration in relating shared behaviour 
with cost and quality relational performance. The study 
of connectedness as an transorganisational parameter, 
however, does not carry consistent results towards the 
hypotheses established. The speculation here is that 
the organic form of inter-firm communication and fluid 
authority structure is too rich a concept to be captured 
in the study. The operational! sation of the 
interconnectedness between firms is yet to be improved. 
The concept of inter-firm is in itself a firm is 
not new, considering the quasi-firm (Powell 1990) and 
international exchange concept (Toyne 1989), as well as 
• I 
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empirical work in strategic marketing alliances 
(Harrigan 1987, Achrol 1992) and international joint 
ventures (Harrigan 1988)• In classical organisational 
studies, structure is seen as a key contingency factor 
to performance and in this inter-firm context, the 
inter-firm structure is correspondingly found to 
moderate relational performance. This part of the 
conclusion bear managerial implications to relationship 
management that supplements decision making efforts. 
Relationship does not automatically lead to perceived 
performance; instead, structure as framework of 
management of inter-firm tasks will moderate the 
results. The concept and constructs of inter-firm 
structure, however, deserve further work in its 
theorising and operationalisation. 
Another conceptual idea conveyed in the study is 
the evaluation of an exchange partner's relational 
performance perceived by the other party, which may 
significantly affect the level of effort each party 
contribute in undertaking exchange and maintaining 
subsequent relationship. The study poses a new 
perspective on how performance of exchange party need be 
assessed. Traditional perspectives, whether in 
purchasing/marketing settings, alliances in 
international business and/or channel literature, 
quantitative performance indicators are normally rated 
and decisions on continued business relationship made. 
The study would recommend the significance of relational 
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performance, i.e. the perception of an exchange party's 
effort in addressing the needs of its partner. This 
direction of measuring relational performance has been 
increasingly adopted in channel research (Kumar, Stern 
and Achrol 1992)• 
The study reported here is an attempt to correlate 
a social governance structure for exchange with the 
perceived relational outcomes• The conclusion yields 
significant implications to purchasing management. On 
the one hand, norms are regarded as shared behaviour and 
a bilateral view is needed for competitive performance. 
There have been claims that relational purchasing in 
just-in-time environment often means the shift of cost 
and quality burdens to suppliers. The study here gives 
a clear message to purchasing as to the need for win-win 
strategies. Moreover, transorganisational structural 
parameters of formalisation, centralisation and 
connectedness have been found to impact relational 
performance. While formalisation is a clearly defined 
concept in this context, centralisation bears a 
different posture and applications based on the study 
must be dealt with carefully as there is no conclusive 
evidence of the positive or negative effect of 
centralisation in organisational studies. The 
implication to management regarding inter-firm structure 
is perhaps that purchasing and marketing organisations 
are to adopt a more organic form of communication and 
adaptations in their interactions. 
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The study sample of electronics industry in Hong 
Kong is significant in terms of its strategic buyer-
seller relationship when more manufacturing facilities 
are being re-located to China. The issue on relational 
performance is significant for the consideration of the 
off-shore production decision. Hong Kong has long been 
regarded as an international city where international 
trading - buying and selling can be efficiently carried 
out. Infrastructure and communication facilities all 
help in the maintenance of viable buyer-seller 
relationship. The study confirms the significant 
relationship between norms-driven transaction climate 
and relational performance which may subsequently lead 
to competitive business performance of firms. The re-
location of production facilities should also consider 
the possible loss of such relational performance, 
bearing in mind competition in many industries is multi-
dimensional in its nature. In many hi-technology 
industries, for instance, suppliers often possess 
advanced and valuable technology that may facilitate 




Bagozzi (1975) and Anderson (1983) have already 
observed that the axiological commitment of researchers 
should be the understanding of and explanation of the 
phenomenon. Hence the study of inter-organisational 
relationship that leads to relational competitive 
performance should take the dual perspectives, i.e. both 
exchange parties, perception be measured in assessing 
the objective set of relationship, indicated by the 
logic that concurrent positive perception of exchange 
party's contribution to own performance help to 
reinforce the norm. This spiral reinforcement concept is 
similar to that proposed by Zand (1971) in which it is 
argued that trust, information, influence and control 
interact in a cyclical manner. In channel research, 
Scheer and Stern (1992) determined the effect of 
influence type and performance outcome on attitude 
toward the influencer. In the industrial 
marketing/purchasing context the spiral reinforcement 
logic can be illustrated in Figure 5.1. 
Study in this approach, however, requires more 
vigorous methodology and methods for its measurement and 
interpretation. Despite this, one-sided study from 
purchasing perspective also carriers its merits, and 
perhaps, with equally valuable implications to both 
marketing and purchasing. 
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Figure 5 . 1 
SPIRAL REINFORCEMENT BETWEEN 
NORMS AND RELATIONAL PERFOBMANCE 
Seller‘s perception of the relational performance 
Buyer's ^ Seller's 
effort performance 
Norms — — 7 re-inforcement/dis-re-inforcement / 
V - ^ / 
Seller‘s Buyer ’ s effort “ performance 
Buyer‘s perception of the relational performance 
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The study can be taken as a first step to our 
understanding of business network, i.e. the complex web 
of relationship among linked organisations in business 
environment. The competitive business performance of a 
firm should eventually be linked to its ability to 
monitor the network in a collective way. Hence, network 
analysis would more completely capture the complexities 
of inter-organisational relationship (Aldrich and 
Whetten 1981). Lincoln (1982) also claims that global 
network patterns can be only be partially understood as 
aggregation of dyadic ties. The study should be 
regarded as one perspective on relational norms and 
performance in a dyadic setting. 
A methodology issue also arises with respect to the 
single informant, which would lead to measurement error 
(Phillips 1981, Bagazzi, Yi and Phillips 1991). In 
general, key informant bias does exist and the 
measurement of social relationships in the study has 
also posed a constraint. Results from analyses of 
variables measured using subjective response may have 
limited external validity because they may be confounded 
by perceptual bias. A better measurement method is to 
approach multiple informants or professional purchasing 
staff in the buying organisations. However, the 
difficulty is that many firms in Hong Kong are small in 
size and more than one informant for reporting supplier 
relationship are not normally available. In fact, the 
pilot test in the study generally confirms this is the 
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case. Despite this, genuine efforts have been applied in 
identifying the 'keyness' of the informant during the 
data collection stage. A further issue is that measure 
development should theoretically be based on separate 
samples and validity of each construct tested in an 
individual sample. Due to constraints of availability of 
samples, this has not been made possible. Hence the 
measurement procedure here is also subject to some 
potential sequential measurement error. 
The measurement of relational performance, carried 
out in a single-item setting, in terms of cost, quality, 
innovation and responsiveness may impose a limitation to 
the study. Single-item measures administered on a 
single occasion do not lend themselves to test of 
reliability, so that the findings of the study will have 
to be interpreted with this in mind. Despite this, the 
four single items on relational performance in the 
framework of Quinn and Rohrbaugh (1983) have been 
repeatedly documented and supported in purchasing 
literature, and are regarded as reliable from 
literature. 
Another limitation of our study is our treatment of 
relational norms as an exogenous variables. Drawn from 
extensive literature work regarding the incremental 
development of inter-organisational relationship, we 
posit the relational norms that underpin buyer-seller 
relationship in industrial markets. We made no attempt 
to identify their antecedent and the relationship 
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history. Future research should be directed to explore 
the dynamics of inter-firm relationship development, 
perhaps with support from more longitudinal case studies 




Future research should firstly be directed in 
overcoming some of the limitations in the study: in 
having a dual perspective of relationship, in having 
multiple informants, and in extending the dyadic 
relationship to the study of network. The dual 
perspectives of inter-firm relationship have been 
applied essentially in channel research (see for 
example, Anderson and Weitz 1992), probably due to more 
availability of dyadic sources of replies. In 
industrial marketing and purchasing, with the exception 
of notable efforts from Heide and John (1992》and Heide 
and Miner (1992), surveys of dyadic relationships from 
views of both buyers and suppliers are extremely 
limited. It is envisaged that the difficulty mainly 
lies with the availability of pairs of response as 
buyers and seller are from disparately different 
organisations. 
Multiple informants would help to produce more 
vigorous discoveries of knowledge in buyer-seller norms. 
However, extracting a methods factor across multiple 
informants does not seem to meet validation criteria 
(John and Reve 1982) . In terms of scope, alternatives 
are also available to correlate sellers' perception of 
norms with buyer‘s perception of relational performance, 
or vice versa. Further research opportunities in this 
direction are abundant. 
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Extending the study of dyads to network would carry 
significant gaps, both in terms of the nature of 
methodology and level of difficulty (Paulson 1983)• 
While the notion that industrial market is an interfirm 
organisation has been widely documented (Alderson 1965, 
Stern and Reve 1980, Anderson 1982, Hutt, Mokwa and 
Shapiro 1986), markets are nonetheless complex 
organisational forms best viewed as a network. Reddy 
and Rao (1990) suggest that network concepts be applied 
at the level of populations rather than inter-firm 
alliances. In this context, communication network and 
organisational-set theories will be relevant theoretical 
bases. Moreover, network studies may not be effectively 
carried out without going through an incremental and 
inductive search for relevant parameters through for 
example extensive case studies (c.f. Mattsson 1985)• 
Further research opportunities also lie on the 
level of analysis. Inter-firm relationship in a buyer-
seller context can be studied with reference to its 
interplay with macro environments e.g. uncertainty (c.f. 
Achrol and Stern 1988), and micro aspects such as 
culture. Longitudinal scale of studies would also 
promote a better understanding on the evolution of the 
inter-firm relationship. 
Overall, both methodological and practical 
difficulties would arise in the course of furthering the 
research. However, with inter - o r g a n i s a t i o n a l 
relationship emerging as a basic unit of analysis in 
I 
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many business and management problems in today ‘ s 
turbulent environments, efforts towards more diverse 
scope and more refined method and methodology would 





SOME DATA ABOUT HONG KONG‘S ELECTRONICS INDUSTRY 
Number of establishments : 1446 
(3.4% of total no. 
of establishments) 
Nimiber of employees : 53591 (11% of total manufacturing 
eniployment) 
Overseas investment ： HK$ 8637 millions 
in Hong Kong with 127 establishments 
einploying 31980 persons 
-major investors ： USA(55%) , Japan(24%), Netherlands(9%) 
Total domestic exports : HK$ 57333 million (25.7% of total domestic 
escorts) 
Total value-added ： 1982 1992 23.0% 23.4% 
Indices of industrial ： 1982 1992 
production 96 156 
1982-1992 average annual 
% change is +8.5% 
a Electrical and electronic products, machinery, professional 
equipment and optical goods 
159 
Product Range 
- Finished products account for about 50% of domestic 
electronic exports, while parts and components account for 
the remaining half. 
_ Finished products are mostly consumer electronics for home 
and personal use. In recent years, Hong Kong is also 
evolving from an exporter of consumer electronics into a 
supplier of electronic products for industrial use. Major 
categories include electronic watches and clocks, conputers 
and peripherals, cassette recorders, electronic games, 
television sets, cellular telephones, photocopiers, compact 
disc players, LCD projection panel. 
_ For parts and components, items are of the mid-range types 
and include parts and accessories for computers and 
telecommunications equipment, printed circuit boards and 
watch movement parts. 
Sources 
1. Hong Kong Annual Report 1994. 
2. Hong Kong Social and Economic Trends 1982-1992. 





LIST OF PRODUCTS CLASSIFIED IN ELECTRONIC INDUSTRY 
OF HONG KONG (PRODUCT CODE: 383) 
Product Products 
Code 
3831 Manufacture of electrical industrial machinery and 
apparatus 
383106 Electric motors for toys 
383107 Electric motors 
383190 Electrical industrial machinery & apparatus n.e.s. 
(e.g. switch gear, transformer, rectifiers, welding 
apparatus etc.) 
3832 Manufacture of transistorized radios 
383204 Transistorized radios 
383206 Clock radios 
383230 Parts for radios (except electronic products 
classified under 3834) 
3333 Manufacture of electrical appliances and housewares 
383301 Vacuum cleaners 
383331 Electric fans 
383333 Electric cooking apparatus 
383335 Electric hair driers 
383337 Air-conditioning machines, domestic Electric 
appliances n.e.s. (e.g. polishers, etc.) 
3 3 3 3 9 9 Parts for electrical appliances 
3834 Manufacture of electronic products 
383401 Television receivers 
383402 Electronic toys, games (TV games etc.) 
383426 Diodes 
383427 Plates, modules and arrays of integrated circuits 
and other con5>onents for con^mter 
383428 Transistors/semi-conductors 
383429 Integrated circuits, mounted, not for computer 
383435 Printed Circuit boards 
383445 Transmitters _ receivers (i.e. tranceivers or 
walkie-talkie) 
383446 Communication equipment n.e.s. 




3835 Manufacture of sound reproducing and recording 
equipment and apparatus 
383501 Portable cassette recorders (with or without 
radios) 
383502 self-contained record players (with or without 
radios) 
383503 Stereo aniplifiers 
383504 Loudspeakers 
383510 Other hi-fi equipment (e.g. turntable, earphones, 
etc.) 383541 Recording tapes (including cassette tapes) 
383542 Videos cassette tapes 
383545 Electric alarm apparatus 
3836 Manufacture of dry batteries 
383610 Batteries & cells, primary 
3837 Manufacture of torch & electric bulbs and tubes 
383715 Torch bulbs 
383716 Electric filament lazcip bulbs 
383718 Neon lights 
383719 Photoflash bulbs 
3338 Manufacture of computing machinery and equipment 
383840 Electronic calculators 
383845 Mini and micro coinputers 
383846 Parts for confuting machinery & equipment 
3 3 3 9 Manufacture of electrical apparatus and supplies 
n.e.c. 
383907 Wire and cable, insulated 
383930 Electric lamps 
383931 Decorative lighting sets 
383990 Electrical apparatus, supplies and parts n.e.s. 




SUMMARY OF FIVE REPRESENTATIVE COMPANY CASES 
IN HELPING TO SET HYPOTHESES FOR THE STUDY 
Relational Performance : 
Cost, quality, innovation, responsiveness. 
Transorganisational Structure 
Formalisation, centralisation, connectedness. 
Norms 
Solidarity, mutuality, flexibility, role integrity, harmonisation of 
conflict. 
Case No. 1 
Norms and cost performance as moderated by centralisation 
Buyer _ A trading coirpany in telecommunication responsible for 
distribution channel support to end users. 
Supplier 一 Designer and manufacturer of electronic communication 
system - PABX, it provides support to distributors and agents. 
In every country, the telecoinrminication system has to pass a 
permission-to-connect (PTC) test before it can be connected to the 
local network. The PTC test usually takes place in two stages, stage 
1 for documentation access and stage 2 the field test. The test is 
costly and needs three months or above for its coinpletion. The 
charges for the test are non-refundable. In the documentation stage, 
the coir5>any/buyer is required to submit all specifications according 
to the local network agent requirement (Hong Kong Telecommunication 
Con5>any Limited). The buyer normal acts as a sole agent and is 
responsible for all distribution channel support to end users. The 
supplier will not do the PTC administration because of cost and 
market uncertainties. 
Costs to buyer includes those for design, PTC approval, marketing and 
sales support, technical and service support to end users. 
Uncertainties for market and PTC approval increase the cost as well. 
Solidarity - Positive 
Since both buyer and supplier wish to enter into the market. 
Centralisation helps to resolve issues such as delivery agreement, 
PTC approval support agreement, sole business agreement, as well as 
on the training and development of technical support staff. 
Mutuality - Positive 
Sharing of costs and burdens often involve commitment from top 
management: in both companies • 
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Flexibility _ Positive 
Supplier need to submit information before PTC stage once cooperative 
relationship is confirmed. The top management also provides 
guidelines on technical training. 
Role integrity - Postive 
Buyer may need confidential design information from supplier for PTC 
application as well as technical support in future. Top management 
of both organisations have to agree on what information can be shared 
among themselves. 
Harmonisation of conflict _ Positive/neutral 
The business is long-termed, supplier and buyer will strive to 
maintain good business relationship. 
( 
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Case No. 2 
Norms and quality performance as moderated by centralisation 
Buyer - Manufacturer which does not want to expand its production 
facilities. 
Supplier 一 OEM factory which produces products for other companies. 
Business relationships are normally in two stages. In the first 
stage, the buyer provides all materials and quality standard 
information. It charges supplier for the labour and workmenship. In 
the second stage, the buyer provides the most update information of 
material specifications to supplier. The supplier has the option to 
buy input materials according to the specifications; or alternately, 
it can go for alternate con^arable specifications which need approval 
from the buyer， The buyer may also supply ASIC chips 七 。 t h e 
supplier, who may also modify the buyer's design. Cost saving is a 
mutual aim for both parties. 
Solidarity - Positive 
Centralised structure help the necessary efforts for mutual 
attainment of quality objective. 
Mutuality 一 Positive 
Engineering changes need frequent communication between senior 
management of both companies. 
Flexibility - Positive 
Management normally appoints specific personnel to handle 
quality/engineering programmes. 
Role integrity - Positive 
Engineering information exchanges are frequent. Some changes may 
need immediate agreement from top management. 
Harmonisation of conflict — Positive 




Case No. 3 
Norms and innovation performance as moderated by connectedness 
Buyer - Manufacturing firm buying integrated circuits in developing 
its own products. 
Suppliers 一 Con^jonents manufacturers such as Goldstar, Philips, 
Mitel, Samsung which produce a full range of telecommunication 
integrated circuits. They also build their own products on these 
chips. 
Suppliers continuously upgrade their components, for enhance 
features, reliability and performance. They provide up-to-date 
application information to buyers. 
Solidarity 一 Positive 
Suppliers wish to be con5>etitive in both component and finished goods 
markets. Exchanges with buyer are at many levels. e.g. design 
engineering, production, purchasing, etc. 
Mutuality — Postive 
Suppliers do extensive research on the application of the products. 
Information is given to buyer to reduce the development time for the 
buyer's products. Free seminars are also provided, on new product 
and/or new application. 
Flexibility - Positive 
Response to market needs is mandatory. Suppliers can supply the same 
chip with different form as requested by the buyer. The chip may 
also be supplied in raw size in order to fit the need of the final 
customers• 
Role integrity ~ Positive 
The research and development staff of both companies keep very 
frequent contacts, on design and application problems. 
Harmonisation of conflict - Positive 
There exists little conflict between coirpanies although the final 
products are in coir^jetition with each others. For example, a 
supplier may have a PABX product, but it also supplies the PABX chips 
to other companies. 
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Case No. 4 
Norms and responsiveness performance as moderated by formalisation 
Buyer 一 Tool/Mould owner or user 
Supplier - Tool/Mould maker 
In the electronics industry, tool/mould is a common item. Nearly 85% 
of casings are made from plastic. This requires tool/mould which 
takes an average 12 working weeks for its manufacture. Craftmanship 
based on personal experience of the workers is important to the mould 
quality. Communication in mould factories are mainly oral and 
informal• 
Solidarity - Negative 
The supplier may not be capable to follow buyer's formal 
communication procedure. The craftman may contact the mould designer 
orally and directly. 
Mutuality _ Negative 
There is little impact on cost burdens. 
Flexibility - Negative 
Formalisation limits the production schedule adjustment of the 
supplier. Role integrity _ Negative 
Verbal communication, decision at the production floor are commonly 
practised. Hard copies of drawings etc. are not normally urgently needed. 
Harmonisation of conflict - Negative 
Conflicts need to be resolved at the production site, which involv^es 
frequent and informal communication. 
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Case No. 5 
Norms and responsiveness performance as moderated by connectedness 
Buyer - Manufacturer of educational toys 
Supplier - Liquid Crystal Displays (LCD) manufacturer 
Although there are standard LCD modules in the market, many 
educational toys manufacturer perfer to build thier own LCDs. 
Solidarity _ Positive 
LCD manufacturing process involves strigent quality control. 
Manufacturers often tailor make the LCD for specific buyers. The 
business involves a sense of unity between the purchasing and 
engineering staff. 
Mutuality — Positive 
The transactions involve san5>le approval costs, though there is risk 
of no orders. Mutual share of cost and burden facilitates 
responsiveness to market. 
Flexibility 一 Positive 
Adjustments to production schedules often take place. 
Role integrity _ Positive 
Communications are frequent and are in many aspects, at pre-
production and production stages. Harmonisation of conflict 一 Positive 
Delivery schedules need tightly monitored because of the seasonality 




QUESTIONNAIRE USED FOR THE PROJECT "BUYER-SELLER 
RELATIONSHIP & RELATIONAL PERFORMANCE FOR COMPETITOR" 
This questionnaire is related to a project on the study of factors 
governing buyer-seller relationship and their iitpact on the 
con5>etitive business performance of the buying firms. 
The questionnaire below are to be answered by an experienced 
purchasing personnel of your coiipany who has knowledge about your 
con5>any's relationship with o ^ of your suppliers, 
(a) who supplies a critical component to your conpany, i.e., a 
direct materill”which""“goesdirectly into your finished 
product (s) and that its quality, cost and/or delivery lead 
time signifTcantly affect the function, price and 
availability of your finished product(s), and 
(b) with which your conpany has had transactions continuously in 
the past two years, and is r ^ the sole source in the market. 
Please note that the relationship of your company with this 
supplier may or may not be good. Thank you in advance for your 
cooperation and help in answering this questionnaire. 
Part A Background Information 
1. Finished product and critical cong>onent referred to in 
coirg>leting this questionnaire 
Finished products: — 
Critical component: 
The component is critical in terms of 
•quality/cost / aval lability/o thers 
Your coirpany has (niiiriber of) supplier (s) for 
this coir5>onent. 
2. Supplier 
Name of supplier: (optional) 
Location of supplier: •Hong Kong/Oversea, country _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 
Number of years of business experience with this supplier:— 
* Please delete wherever Inapp^roprla.te 
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Part B The following questions are to be answered according to the 
perception and opinion of the respondent, with reference to the 
relationship with the supplier for the critical component and 
finished product stated in Part A. 
Please circle your answer to the following questions according to 
the following scale 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
totally generally disagree slightly slightly agree generally totally 
disagree disagree disagree agree agree agree 
OUR RELATIONSHIP WITH THIS SUPPLIER IS SUCH THAT： 
Totally Totally 
disagree agree 
1. Both our organisations 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
regard each other as 
"preferred" supplier and 
customer so that we both 
aim at preserving good 
working relationship with 
one another. 
2. There exists common 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
interests and 
responsibilities among us 
in providing our final 
customers with quality 
products at competitive 
price. 
3. We often act together in 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
seeking unified solutions 
to problems (e.g. on 
quality and delivery). 
4. When needs arise, both of 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
us are willing to make 
sacrifices (e.g. low price, 
small-batch delivery, early 
payment) for which there is 
no immediate compensation• 
5. In times of downturn, both 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
of us are willing to stay 
together and give possible 
assistance to each other. 
6. Each of us often seek 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
sources of actions which 




1 2 3 4 5 6 ,7 8 
totally generally disagree slightly slightly agree generally totally 
disagree disagree disagree agree agree agree 
Totally Totally 
disagree agree 
7. Our business relationship 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
is based more on mutual 
trust than strictly on the 
terms of our contracts. 
8. We both believe that our 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
business relationship has 
win-win value, i.e. mutual 
benefits to both sides, in 
the long run. 
9. Negotiation is practised 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
as a dynamic process of 
adjustment, aiming at 
mutually satisfying 
solutions. 
10. We focus on cost and 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
benefit deriving from on-
going relationship, not on 
gains or loss of an 
individual transaction. 
11. Since exchange benefits 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
are seldom equally shared 
due to unforeseen 
circumstances, we trust 
one another to make some 
fair adjustment over the 
longer run. 
12• Our business/cooperative 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
relationship over the 
years does not bring about 
a fair distribution of 
benefits. 
13. Both our organisations 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
contend that flexibility 
and reliance on ”common 
honesty and decency" can 
help to cope with 
uncertainties associated 




1 2 3 4 5 6 , 7 8 
totally generally disagree slightly slightly agree generally totally 
disagree disagree disagree agree agree agree 
Totally Totally 
disagree agree 
14. Both our organisations are 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
willing to make 
adjustments to contracts 
in the face of problems or 
special circumstances• 
15. Urgent orders and request 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
can often be verbally 
committed prior to the 
Issuance of a formal 
order. 
16. Both our organisations can 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
cooperate to work out 
solutions for problems 
arising from forecast/ 
predication failure. 
17. In agreeing on the terms 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
and conditions of 
contracts, it is assumed 
that some flexibility in 
their performance may 
occur. 
18. Original agreement on 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
contractual terms is often 
adhered to even when 
request for changes in 
made by either party in 
response to changing 
environment. 
19. Our relationship involves 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
more complex 
responsibilities or tasks 
(e.g. new business 
opportunities, joint 
programmes on marketing/ 
quality), not limited to 
those relating to the 
transactions only. 
20. In negotiation, both our 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
organisations give 
considerations to broader 





1 2 3 4 5 6 ,7 8 
totally generally disagree slightly slightly agree generally totally 
disagree disagree disagree agree agree agree 
Totally Totally 
disagree agree 
21. There exists frequent 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
formal and informal 
communication between our 
two organisations• 
22. Both our organisations 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
communicate/share 
information that has 
strategic/long-term 




23. Both of us are able to 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
keep each other informed 
about possible changes in 
product/market that may 
affect the planning of 
the other party. 
24. Our relationship and 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
communication are limited 
to the essential details 
of the purchase/sale 
only. 
25. Both our organisations 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
have non-negative 
attutude towards the 
other party for the 
existence of conflict, 
regardless of their 
nature and degree. 
26. Both of us would render 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
our maximum cooperation 
and openness to seek each 
other‘s view in investigating 
and resolving problems 
that lead to conflict. 
27. There exists effective 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
communication between our 
organisations that help 
to minimise the occurrence 
of conflict due to 




1 2 34 5 6 ,7 8 
totally generally disagree slightly slightly agree generally totally 
disagree disagree disagree agree agree agree 
Totally Totally 
disagree agree 
28. When conflict arises, we 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
often review history of 
the problems and the 
facts of the issues 
thoroughly• 
29. Both our organisations 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
always aim to reach 
agreement or to resolve 
conflict among ourselves, 
without resorting to 
legal procedure or 
arbitration. 
30. Settlement of conflict/ 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
dispute usually consists 
of straightforward 
considerations to who/ 
what is right/wrong, and 
who has power. 
31. There are formal rules 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
and procedures that 
govern the planning and 
iiiplementation of the 
transactions. 
32. There exists clearly- 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
defined contact points 
between both 
organisations for 
specific issues of the 
transactions. 
33. There are formal 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
communication channels 
between our two 
organisations. 
34. We have routinely set 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
meeting schedules 
regarding our business. 
35. The lateral communication 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
between both organisations 
in contract negotiation is 
mainly among the top 
purchasing and marketing 




1 2 3 4 5 6 ,7 8 
totally generally disagree slightly slightly agree generally totally 
disagree disagree disagree agree agree agree 
Totally Totally 
disagree agree 
36. We often have to refer to 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
higher authorities for 
decisions regarding the 
business. 
37. Conflict resolution/ 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
negotiation are essentially 
made through top management 
of both companies. 
38• There are more contacts 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
between top management 
than lower-level 
management between 
both organisations in 
our working relationship. 
39. The communication between 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
personnel of different 
ranks in both organisations 
(e.g. higher-rank personnel 
of buying firm with lower-
rank personnel of selling 
firm and vice-versa) can 
be freely practised. 
40. In contract negotiation, 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
both organisations can 
easily gather their 
intelligence with 
expertise form different 
fields (e.g. engineering, 
finance). 
41. Communication between our 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
two organisations is such 
that the total situation 
of the business 
transaction can quickly 
be assessed. 





1 2 3 4 5 6 ,7 8 
totally generally disagree slightly slightly agree generally totally 
disagree disagree disagree agree agree agree 
Totally Totally 
disagree agree 
43. This supplier has been 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
able to rationalise its 
total production cost 
which benefits our buying 
organisation in terms of 
lower acquisition/ 
transaction cost. 
44. This supplier has been 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
able to sustain/irtprove 
its quality which is in 
line with the quality 
policy of our con5>any. 
45. This supplier has put in 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
more resources for 
innovation and this helps 
our company in product 
modification and/or new 
product development. 
46. This supplier has better 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
planning for their 
production and that helps 
our firm to respond to 
changing customers‘ need 
speedily • 
47. The supplier has good 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
business performance in 
its dealings with our 
company and this benefits 
our company as well. 
48. The supplier‘s performance 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 




Part C Information of the respondent 
Name of respondent : 
Company • 
Post in company : 
Number of years of experience of the respondent is dealing with the 
supplier : 
I regard my knowledge of the relationship with this supplier to be 
(please ^). 
• • • • • 
very good fair not poor 
good good 
Tel: Fax: Date: -
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